Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite State v. Rossi, 741 P.2d 1223.

95 citing documents.

State v. Alfartousi Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2026
Hanger v. Hanger Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2025
Hanger v. Hanger Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2025
He has therefore failed 9 HANGER v. HANGER Decision of the Court to overcome the presumption that judges are “free of bias and prejudice.”
Olesen v. daniel/burge Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2023
Olesen v. daniel/burge Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2023
A party challenging a judge’s impartiality must overcome the presumption that judges are “free of bias and prejudice,” and must “set forth a specific basis for the claim of partiality and prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the judge is biased or prejudiced,” ¶ 11 (1999).
Leslie v. Leslie Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2023
Leslie v. Leslie Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2023
A party challenging a judge’s impartiality must overcome the presumption that judges are “free of bias and prejudice,” and must “set forth a specific basis for the claim of partiality and prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the judge is biased or prejudiced,” ¶ 11 (1999).
State v. MacIas 469 P.3d 472 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
State v. MacIas 469 P.3d 472 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
Ctr., ¶ 29 (App. 2010) (a party challenging a judicial officer’s impartiality must overcome the presumption that such officers are “free of bias and prejudice” ()).
Hinton v. Hinton Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
Hinton v. Hinton Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
Ctr., ¶ 29 (App. 2010) ().
Taraska v. Taraska Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
Taraska v. Taraska Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
In reviewing this type of claim against a judicial officer, we presume judges to be “free of bias and prejudice.”
State v. Brown Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
State v. Brown Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
In reviewing such claims, we presume judges to be “free of bias and prejudice.” (citation omitted).
Russell v. Sahl Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
Russell v. Sahl Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
A party challenging a judge’s impartiality must overcome the presumption that judges are “free of bias and prejudice,” and must “set forth a specific basis for the claim of partiality and prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the judge is biased or prejudiced.” ¶ 11 (1999).
Costa v. MacKey 261 P.3d 449 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2011
Costa v. MacKey 261 P.3d 449 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2011
Simon v. MARICOPA MEDICAL CENTER 234 P.3d 623 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2010
Simon v. MARICOPA MEDICAL CENTER 234 P.3d 623 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2010
A party challenging a trial judge’s impartiality must overcome the presumption that trial judges are “free of bias and prejudice,” , and must “set forth a specific basis for the claim of partiality and prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the judge is biased or prejudiced.” ¶ 11
State v. Ellison 140 P.3d 899 Ariz. 2006
State v. Ellison 140 P.3d 899 Ariz. 2006
ures would be rendered meaningless and effectively circumvented if permission to question a judge’s partiality rested not on concrete facts and specific allegations but on mere speculation, suspicion, apprehension, or 17 imagination.” 5 ¶38 “[T]here is no per se disqualification of a sentencing trial judge who presides over a codefendant’s trial.”
State v. Chiappetta 107 P.3d 366 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2005
State v. Chiappetta 107 P.3d 366 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2005
"A party challenging a trial judge's impartiality must overcome a strong presumption that trial judges are "`free of bias and prejudice.'" "
State v. Cropper 68 P.3d 407 Ariz. 2003
State v. Cropper 68 P.3d 407 Ariz. 2003
¶22 A party challenging a trial judge’s impartiality must overcome a strong presumption that trial judges are “free of bias and prejudice.” , 510 ¶ 11, ( , ).
State v. Finch 46 P.3d 421 Ariz. 2002
State v. Finch 46 P.3d 421 Ariz. 2002
State v. Cañez 42 P.3d 564 Ariz. 2002
State v. Canez 42 P.3d 564 Ariz. 2002
State v. Cañez 42 P.3d 564 Ariz. 2002
Although Cañez was using crack cocaine the night of the murder, there was no evidence of his degree of intoxication nor “that it overwhelmed his ability to control his physical behavior.” -31 , -56 (1991) (upholding finding of no (G)(1) -51 , -29 (1987), in which there was uncontroverted expert testimony that defendant’s addiction was so great that his “whole personality began to evolve around the use of cocaine”).
State v. Canez 42 P.3d 564 Ariz. 2002
Although Cañez was using crack cocaine the night of the murder, there was no evidence of his degree of intoxication nor “that it overwhelmed his ability to control his physical behavior.” -31, -56 (1991) (upholding finding of no (G)(1) -51, -29 (1987), in which there was uncontroverted expert 58 testimony that defendant’s addiction was so great that his “whole personality began to evolve around the use of cocaine”).
State v. Pandeli 26 P.3d 1136 Ariz. 2001
State v. Pandeli 26 P.3d 1136 Ariz. 2001
State v. Sansing 26 P.3d 1118 Ariz. 2001
State v. Sansing 26 P.3d 1118 Ariz. 2001
State v. Hurley 4 P.3d 455 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2000
State v. Hurley 4 P.3d 455 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2000
State v. White 982 P.2d 819 Ariz. 1999
State v. White 982 P.2d 819 Ariz. 1999
Possibility of rehabilitation ¶ 25 In his sentencing memorandum, the defendant asserts capability of rehabilitation within the limits of a life sentence in prison, citing the mitigating factor “ability to be rehabilitated,”
State v. Medina 975 P.2d 94 Ariz. 1999
State v. Medina 975 P.2d 94 Ariz. 1999
It is well established, however, that a “trial judge is presumed to be free of bias and prejudice.”
State v. Trostle 951 P.2d 869 Ariz. 1997
State v. Trostle 951 P.2d 869 Ariz. 1997
State v. Lee 944 P.2d 1222 Ariz. 1997
State v. Lee 944 P.2d 1222 Ariz. 1997
Miller v. Superior Court 938 P.2d 1128 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1997
Miller v. Superior Court 938 P.2d 1128 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1997
(citation omitted); Ariz. R.Crim.
State v. Medrano 914 P.2d 225 Ariz. 1996