Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite State v. Bridgeforth, 750 P.2d 3.

40 citing documents.

  • State v. Khorrami Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2021
  • State v. Khorrami Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2021
  • Perla M. v. Dcs Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
  • Perla M. v. Dcs Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
    PERLA M. v. DCS et al. Decision of the Court equating the two as the same, we would violate “the rule of statutory construction that requires us to presume that ‘when the legislature alters the language of a statute[,] it intended to create a change in the existing law.’” ¶ 6 (App. 2000) ().
  • State v. Lemons Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
  • State v. Lemons Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
    ¶18 “The primary test for jury instructions is whether the instructions considered as a whole, sufficiently instructed the jury on the proper rule of law.”
  • State v. Nolte Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
  • State v. Nolte Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
  • Grubaugh v. Hon blomo/lawrence 359 P.3d 1008 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
  • Grubaugh v. Hon blomo/lawrence 359 P.3d 1008 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
  • McKesson Corp. v. Arizona Health Care Cost Containment System 286 P.3d 784 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2012
  • McKesson Corp. v. Arizona Health Care Cost Containment System 286 P.3d 784 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2012
    (noting the “presumption that when the legislature alters the language of a statute it intended to create a change in the existing law.”) (citation omitted); Ariz. Dep’t , (recognizing that we interpret statutes and r
  • State of Arizona v. Kenneth John Falcone Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2011
  • State of Arizona v. Kenneth John Falcone Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2011
    10 of intention, knowledge, recklessness, and criminal negligence.”
  • Staples v. Concord Equities, L.L.C. 209 P.3d 163 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
  • Staples v. Concord Equities, L.L.C. 209 P.3d 163 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
  • Enterprise Leasing Co. v. Arizona Department of Revenue 211 P.3d 1 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2008
  • Enterprise Leasing Co. v. Arizona Department of Revenue 211 P.3d 1 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2008
  • State v. Slayton 154 P.3d 1057 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
  • State v. Slayton 154 P.3d 1057 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
  • State of Arizona v. Jeffrey Allen Brown Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2003
  • State of Arizona v. Jeffrey Allen Brown Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2003
    (1978 code abandoned use of terms “specific intent” and “general intent”); State v. Robles, 128 Ariz. 89, (specific and general intent labels no longer applicable).
  • In Re Kyle M. 27 P.3d 804 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2001
  • In Re Kyle M. 27 P.3d 804 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2001
    -64 , -7 (1988) (holding that statutory amendment eliminating phrase “and intentionally” changed culpable mental state from “knowing and intentional” to only “knowing”).
  • In Re Paul M. 7 P.3d 131 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2000
  • In Re Paul M. 7 P.3d 131 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2000
    Such a conclusion violates the rule of statutory construction that requires us to presume that “when the legislature alters the language of a statute[,] it intended to create a change in the existing law.” , (holding that deletion of “and intentionally” from phrase “knowingly and intentionally” in A.R.S.
  • State v. Proctor 2 P.3d 647 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1998
  • State v. Proctor 2 P.3d 647 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1998
    (approving jury instruction that state need not prove any person relied on defendant’s representations for fraudulent scheme and artifice conviction); , (although conviction for grand theft by false pretenses under A.R.S.
  • State v. Lara 880 P.2d 1124 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1994
  • State v. Lara 880 P.2d 1124 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1994
    The state nevertheless contends, , that it was not error to refuse appellant’s requested voluntariness instruction because the court’s other instructions adequately covered the same subject, specifically, its instructions on premeditation and intent.
  • State v. Averyt 876 P.2d 1158 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1994
  • State v. Averyt 876 P.2d 1158 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1994
    (statutory amendment eliminating phrase “and intentionally” shifted focus of culpable mental state from knowing and intentional to that of knowledge only).
  • State v. Verdugo 883 P.2d 417 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1993
  • State v. Verdugo 883 P.2d 417 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1993
    approved in pertinent part
  • State v. Witwer 856 P.2d 1183 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1993
  • State v. Witwer 856 P.2d 1183 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1993
    Because no contrary legislative purpose plainly appears, “intentionally or knowingly” applies to all elements of the sexual abuse statute, including “without consent.” , (absent clear legislative intent to the contrary, prescribed mental state applies to all elements of the offense), aff'd as modified
  • State v. McClintic 774 P.2d 829 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1989
  • Distinguished State v. McClintic 774 P.2d 829 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1989
    The state argues that this result is inconsistent with this court’s , approved in pertinent part
  • Energy Fuels Nuclear, Inc. v. Coconino County 766 P.2d 83 Ariz. 1988
  • Energy Fuels Nuclear, Inc. v. Coconino County 766 P.2d 83 Ariz. 1988
    (when the legislature alters the language of a statute it presumably intends a change in the existing law).