Cited by

Urquidez, 213 Ariz. at 52, ¶ 7

¶80 To determine whether facts constitute a “single act” that would require concurrent sentences under § 13–116, –13, –09 (1989).

¶23 the Arizona Supreme Court explained the framework for determining when a set of facts involving multiple convictions constitutes a “single act.” Prior to Gordon, the court followed a rigid “identical elements test” to decide whether two acts were distinguishable from one another.

-75 ¶¶ 101-09, -21 (2005) (applying Gordon analysis); ¶ 6, (consecutive sentences proper where crime of disorderly conduct committed against multiple victims); St

¶138 To determine whether Forde’s conduct underlying counts four through six constitutes a single act under § 13-116

(jury, rather than court, must determine whether manner in which scissors used rendered them a deadly weapon).6 Accordingly, if an item is not inherently dangerous as a matter of law, it is up to the jury to

A person’s hands, as the State concedes, do not qualify as a “dangerous instrument” or a “deadly weapon.” -11 , -07 (1989) (holding that “[t]he trial court erred by allowing the jury to find that defendant’s fists were dangerous instruments,” and citing the majority rule that “body parts do not constitute deadly weapons or dangerous instruments”).

P.2d 1204 (1989), for the proposition that a person‟s feet cannot be dangerous instruments.

The statute itself provides little guidance in defining when separately-charged offenses must be considered “a single act,” , our supreme court detailed an analytical “construct with which to interpret the statute.” It stated that courts should judge a defendant’s eligibility for consecutive sentences by considering the facts of each crime separately, subtracting from the factual transaction the evidence ne

To determine whether the defendant has committed a single act requiring concurrent sentences, , : 7 [W]e ...

§ 13-116 -16 , -12 (1989).

¶ 8 In his presentencing memoranda to the trial court, , to argue that the court should treat the two felonies as spree offenses committed on one occasion.

(distinguishing between “objects” that can be used as dangerous instruments for the purposes of A.R.S.

To determine whether conduct constitutes a single act for purposes of § 13-116

To determine whether Brown’s conduct constituted a “single act,”

is “used to determine whether defendant’s conduct ‘constitutes a single act, which requires concurrent sentences, or multiple acts, which permit consecutive sentences.’” , quoting Gordon, 161 Ariz. at 312 , 778 P.2d at 1208 .

¶58 To determine whether conspiracy and transportation constitute separate acts, for which consecutive sentences are permissible, or only one act, for which sentences must be concurrent, we first apply the “identical elements test.” ( ).

§ 13-116 (1989), which provides that “[a]n act or omission which is made punishable in different ways by differ *358 ent sections of the laws may be punished under both, but in no event may sentences be other than concurrent.” The statute precludes the imposition of consecutive sentences when the defendant’s conduct is a “single act.”

( , ) (stating that, when an instrument is not inherently dangerous as a matter of law, “like a gun or knife,” the jury can infer whether defendant used it in such a way as to make it a deadly weapon).

(setting forth “identical elements” test).