Cited by

–32 (1989) (omission of presumption of innocence instruction was not fundamental error where the court otherwise gave correct instructions placing the burden of proof on the State).

See Ariz. Const. art. 6, § 31(B); ¶ 19, n.5 (App. 2018).

¶39 But “[d]eclaring a mistrial is an unusual remedy for trial error and should not be resorted to unless justice requires such a result.”

See Ariz. Const. art. 6, § 31(B)

¶ 37 (1999) (certified copies of a California disposition of arrest); (certified copies of a plea agreement signed by the defendant and docket sheets indicating the agreement was filed in court); Nash, 143 Ariz. at 403 (certified commitment records from other states); (certified records of commitment); ¶ 1

-32, -36 (1989) (stating the factors that the court must consider in its totality of the circumstances evaluation of such an omission include all the instructions to the jury and the weight of the evidence).

See Kentucky v. Whorton, 441 U.S. 786, 789 (1979); –32 (1989)

“[P]otential prejudice to a defendant may be mitigated by prohibiting the prosecution from revealing the nature of the prior convictions,” otherwise known as “sanitization” of the conviction.

or has been made in the jury instructions, we consider whether the error was harmless.” ¶ 27, (citation omitted); ¶ 19, (concluding that a trial court’s deviation from the Portillo instruction3 is subject to harmless error analysis); -32, -36 (1989) (concluding that the trial court’s omission of the final presumption of innocence instruction was “harmless,” and therefore did not constitute fundamental error).

Police do not create exigent circumstances if they do “not violate or threaten to violate the Fourth Amendment prior to the exigency.” Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1863 (2011); -33, -37 (1989) ( ).

(finding that defendant waived his claim that he was entitled to be tried before “a regularly seated superior court judge” rather than a judge pro tempore by failing to make a timely objection).

courts may consider other kinds of evidence as well.” (state proved prior conviction based on out-of-state commitment record); State v. Nash, 143 Ariz. 392, 403, (holding prison records sufficient to establish prior convictions).

denied, 471 U.S. 1143, 105 S. Ct. 2689, 86 L. Ed. 2d 706 (1985), this court held that the state may prove prior convictions by evidence other than a certified judgment of conviction.”

(-34, -38 (1989)); Hansen, 156 Ariz. at 297, 751 P.2d at 957 ( ).

Although Cons uses words like “fatally defective,” “reversible error,” and “constitutional right,” he does not specifically argue that the error is fundamental, that is, “error [that] goes to the foundation of the case or deprives [him] of an essential right to his defense.”

Although Cons uses words like “fatally defective,” “reversible error,” and “constitutional right,” he does not specifically argue that the error is fundamental, that is, “error [that] goes to the foundation of the case or deprives [him] of an essential right to his defense.”

-33 , -37 (1989); , (exigent circumstances can permit entry of home without warrant).

at 482 ¶ 11, 73 P.3d at 613 (citing Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 43 (1984); ).

¶ 10 When reviewing a ruling on the admissibility of a prior conviction, this court will reverse the trial court's determination if the court abused its discretion, , , or if it committed an error of law.