Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite State v. Oliver, 760 P.2d 1071.

92 citing documents.

State v. Johnson Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2026
State v. Johnson Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2026
Smith v. Arizona, 602 U.S. 779, 783–84 (2024)
State v. Hernandez Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2026
State v. Hernandez Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2026
Our supreme court later expanded on Pope by extending its holding “to child molestation cases.”
State v. Tupa Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2025
State v. Tupa Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2025
“This standard of relevance is not particularly high.”
State v. Garcia El Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2023
State v. Garcia El Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2023
The standard of relevance “is not particularly high.”
State v. Mallotte Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2022
State v. Mallotte Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2022
State v. Canales-Perez Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2022
State v. Canales-Perez Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2022
The evidence was highly prejudicial, (noting that unless the victim's prior sexual acts provided the ability to fabricate "then the trial court should 5 STATE v. CANALES-PEREZ Decision of the Court exclude the evidence because its probative value is
State v. Shedd Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
State v. Shedd Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
State v. Rodriguez Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
State v. Rodriguez Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
These rights are not violated, however, where “evidence has been properly excluded.” ¶ 33 (App. 2002); see also Buccheri-Bianca, 233 Ariz. at 328, ¶ 11
State v. Green Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
State v. Green Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
“This standard of relevance is not particularly high.”
State v. MacIas Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
State v. MacIas Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
“This standard of relevance is not particularly high.” (citing United States v. Southland Corp., 760 F.2d 1366, 1376 (2d Cir. 1985), and Carter v. Hewitt, 617 F.2d 961, 966 (3d Cir. 1980)).
State v. Williams Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
State v. Williams Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
F. Motion to Impeach AW ¶31 Defendant argues he was denied a fair trial because he was precluded from cross-examining AW regarding her “delay” in reporting the abuse from the time “it would have been natural for her to report it if it was true.” ¶32 “A trial court has broad discretion to admit or exclude evidence at trial.” (citation omitted).
State v. Dees Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
State v. Dees Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 679; () (stating a court does not violate a defendant’s confrontation rights by limiting cross-examination to “matters admissible under ordinary evidentiary rules, including relevance”).
Busso-Estopellan v. Hon. mroz/state 364 P.3d 472 Ariz. 2015
Busso-Estopellan v. Hon. mroz/state 364 P.3d 472 Ariz. 2015
401(a); (noting that the relevance standard “is not particularly high”).
State v. Woody Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
State v. Woody Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
401 (defining “relevant evidence”); (observing “standard of relevance is not very high”).
State v. Gomez-Torres Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
State v. Gomez-Torres Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
401 (defining “relevant evidence”); (observing “standard of relevance is not particularly high”).
State v. Gollihar Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
State v. Gollihar Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
(“In Arizona, evidence of prior sexual history is inadmissible on the issue of motive unless the record clearly establishes a factual predicate from which motive can be inferred.”); Herrera, 232 Ariz. at 550, ¶ 41, 307 P.3d at 117 (finding evidence of victim’s prior sexual history inadm
State v. Leker Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
State v. Leker Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
“If evidence has no probative value, it is inadmissible under Rule 401.” Ariz. R. Evid.
State v. Gibson Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
State v. Gibson Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
State v. Cravets Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
State v. Cravets Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
“This standard of relevance is not particularly high.”
State of Arizona v. Angelino Paolo Buccheri-Bianca 312 P.3d 123 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2013
State of Arizona v. Angelino Paolo Buccheri-Bianca 312 P.3d 123 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2013
The rights asserted are “limited to evidence which is relevant and not unduly prejudicial,” and, as discussed above, evidence of the victims’ immigration status was properly excluded.
State of Arizona v. Edward James Rose 297 P.3d 906 Ariz. 2013
State of Arizona v. Edward James Rose 297 P.3d 906 Ariz. 2013
(noting that the “standard of relevance is not 26 particularly high”).
State of Arizona v. Cooperman 282 P.3d 446 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2012
State of Arizona v. Cooperman 282 P.3d 446 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2012
is not particularly high.”
State v. Dixon 250 P.3d 1174 Ariz. 2011
State v. Dixon 250 P.3d 1174 Ariz. 2011
(applying common law 19 rape shield doctrine to child molestation victims).
State v. Abdi 248 P.3d 209 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2011
State v. Abdi 248 P.3d 209 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2011
State of Arizona v. Louie Thomas MacHado Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2010
State of Arizona v. Louie Thomas MacHado Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2010
right is secured by the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315 (1974), the Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment, Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 324 (2006); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 18-19 (1967), the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 290 n.3, 302 (1973); and article II, §§ 4 and 24 of the Arizona Constitution.