Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite State v. Carrillo, 750 P.2d 883.

64 citing documents.

State v. Melendez 535 P.3d 16 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2023
State v. Melendez 535 P.3d 16 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2023
See, (“Arizona courts have recognized that the protection against self-incrimination includes freedom from adverse consequences flowing from defendant’s exercise of his right.
State of Arizona v. Tito Rene Scott 530 P.3d 1178 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2023
State of Arizona v. Tito Rene Scott 530 P.3d 1178 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2023
¶ 54 (2003) (noting that a confession may be obtained by lying about the existence of physical evidence if the suspect’s will has not been overborne) ().
State v. Zavala Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2023
State v. Zavala Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2023
See, e.g., Escalante, 245 Ariz. at 141 ¶ 19; –32 (1988); Sorrell, 132 Ariz. at 329.
State v. Dann Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2022
State v. Dann Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2022
“The police are not forbidden to outsmart—they are forbidden to compel.”
State v. Taylor Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
State v. Taylor Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
F. Lack of Administration of Miranda Rights ¶26 “Before the results of any custodial interrogation may be directly used by the state, the authorities must tell the defendant that he has the right to remain silent as well as the right to the assistance of counsel.” (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)).
State v. Schaeffer Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
State v. Schaeffer Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
see also Tapia, 159 Ariz. at 289 (stating that a confession induced by fraud is not made involuntary unless there is some evidence that the defendant’s will was overborne or that the confession was false or unreliable).
State of Arizona v. Joel Randu Escalante-Orozco 386 P.3d 798 Ariz. 2017
State of Arizona v. Joel Randu Escalante-Orozco 386 P.3d 798 Ariz. 2017
State of Arizona v. Jamonte Lawrence Olague 381 P.3d 269 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2016
State of Arizona v. Jamonte Lawrence Olague 381 P.3d 269 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2016
(stating voluntariness of waiver depends on objective evaluation of police conduct).
State v. Young Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
State v. Young Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
State v. Israel Joseph Naranjo 321 P.3d 398 Ariz. 2014
State v. Israel Joseph Naranjo 321 P.3d 398 Ariz. 2014
State of Arizona v. Christopher Mathew Payne 306 P.3d 17 Ariz. 2013
State of Arizona v. Christopher Mathew Payne 306 P.3d 17 Ariz. 2013
But because “the protection against self-incrimination includes freedom from adverse consequences flowing from defendant’s exercise of his right,” it is reversible error to refer to a defendant’s “protected silence,” if jurors would “naturally and necessarily perceive it to be a comment on the defendant’s failure to testify,” ¶ 33
State of Arizona v. Steven John Parker 296 P.3d 54 Ariz. 2013
State of Arizona v. Steven John Parker 296 P.3d 54 Ariz. 2013
Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 618-19 (1976)
State of Arizona v. Richard Lee Palmer 270 P.3d 891 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2012
State of Arizona v. Richard Lee Palmer 270 P.3d 891 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2012
¶ 9 , vacated in part on other grounds, , (granting review only on issues of voluntary confession and improper comment on invocation of rights), the defendant argued statements the deceased victim had made should have been excluded as hearsay.
State v. Fischer 199 P.3d 663 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2008
State v. Fischer 199 P.3d 663 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2008
State v. Huerstel 75 P.3d 698 Ariz. 2003
State v. Huerstel 75 P.3d 698 Ariz. 2003
State v. Blakley 65 P.3d 77 Ariz. 2003
State v. Blakley 65 P.3d 77 Ariz. 2003
-37 , -95 (1988) (citing Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 , 107 S.Ct.
State v. Tinajero 935 P.2d 928 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1997
State v. Tinajero 935 P.2d 928 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1997
State v. Doody 930 P.2d 440 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1996
State v. Doody 930 P.2d 440 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1996
the court addressed the propriety of deceptive interrogation tactics: The very nature of law enforcement encourages police to use some artifice and trickery in their work.
State v. Strayhand 911 P.2d 577 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1995
State v. Strayhand 911 P.2d 577 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1995
The significance of these points is that, while the Defendant’s condition alone was certainly not enough to say that he was not acting of his own free will, the court should evaluate voluntariness “in light of what the police should perceive from the objective manifestations of the suspect’s physical or mental condition.”
State v. Maturana 882 P.2d 933 Ariz. 1994
State v. Maturana 882 P.2d 933 Ariz. 1994
See, , (the police cannot be expected to give up all tactical questioning devices, only those designed to overcome a suspect’s will).
State v. Strong 875 P.2d 166 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1993
State v. Strong 875 P.2d 166 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1993
vacated in part on other grounds
State v. Conde 846 P.2d 843 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1992
State v. Conde 846 P.2d 843 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1992
State v. Stanley 809 P.2d 944 Ariz. 1991
State v. Stanley 809 P.2d 944 Ariz. 1991
State v. Amaya-Ruiz 800 P.2d 1260 Ariz. 1990
State v. Amaya-Ruiz 800 P.2d 1260 Ariz. 1990
State v. Thompson 803 P.2d 937 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1990
State v. Thompson 803 P.2d 937 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1990
modified on other grounds