Cited by

However, in discussing Rule 703, our supreme court has instructed that on direct examination, an expert witness “may disclose facts or data that have not been admitted in evidence—and that may not be admissible—if they form a basis for his opinion.”

Relying on Manning’s calculation that the truck-trailer traveled from the stop sign to the area of impact in 6.2 seconds, (“A testifying expert may rely on the opinions of other experts if such reliance is the kind of material on which experts in the field base their opinions.”) (internal quotation marks omitted), Kuzel concluded that a reasonably attentive driver would have braked for at least 3.6 seconds at .7 g (using an a

A testifying expert may not, however, act as a “conduit for another non- testifying expert’s opinion.”

(“One doctor's reliance on the report or opinion of another qualified doctor is practically the paradigm of reasonable reliance.”).

(“if the testifying expert merely acts as a conduit for another non- testifying expert’s opinion, the ‘expert opinion’ is hearsay and is inadmissible”).

It is permissible, however, for a testifying expert to rely on the facts, data, or opinions supplied by others if this “is the kind of material on which experts in the field base their opinions.” (citation omitted).

A testifying expert may not, however, act as a “conduit for another non-testifying expert’s opinion.”

¶31 “A testifying expert may rely on the opinions of other experts if such reliance is ‘the kind of material on which experts in 11 STATE v. FOSHAY Opinion of the Court the field base their opinions.’” quoting Lewis v. Rego, 757 F.2d 66, 74 (3d Cir. 1985).

But “Rule 703 does not authorize admitting hearsay on the pretense that it is the basis for expert opinion when, in fact, the expert adds nothing to the out-of-court statements other than transmitting them to the jury.” 29 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 6273 (Victor James Gold ed. 2015); (expert testimony that merely parrots or summarizes another’s opinion is inadmissible).

Our supreme court has stated: “One doctor’s reliance on the report or opinion of another qualified doctor is practically the paradigm of reasonable reliance.”

¶124 -62 ¶¶ 157-64, -57 (2004), for the proposition that the prosecution may not elicit a diagnosis that is not in evidence.

(citation omitted) (noting error is harmless or non-prejudicial when it can be said beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not affect the jury verdict); , (“[W]e have no difficulty concluding beyond a reaso

See Rogovich, 188 Ariz. at 42, 932 P.2d at 798

¶ 13 Under Rule 703 of the Arizona Rules of Evidence, a testifying expert may testify to the facts or data underlying his opinion for the limited purpose “of showing the bases of that opinion, not to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” 6

Once disclosed to the jury, this information is “not admitted as substantive evidence, but only for purposes of showing the basis of the expert’s opinion.”

While we do not opine on this issue, , indicating that "[a] testifying expert may rely on the opinions of other experts if such reliance is ‘the kind of material on which experts in the field base their opinions.'

is harmless if we can say, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error did not contribute to or affect the verdict.” State v. Bible, 175 Ariz. at 588 , 858 P.2d at 1191 ( , 150 & n. 11, , 1076 & n. 11 (1989)).

Moreover, in State v. Lundstrom we held that “under most circumstances an expert may testify as to the substance of another expert’s opinion if the testifying expert reasonably relied on that other opinion in forming his own opinion.” , , 671 *

see also Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22-23 , 87 S.Ct.