Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite State v. Wagstaff, 794 P.2d 118.

135 citing documents.

Frank Hoffman v. Hon. chandler/state 295 P.3d 939 Ariz. 2013
Read in isolation, § 13- 4033(A)(3) would authorize Hoffman to directly appeal the post- judgment restitution order as it indisputably affected his “substantial rights.” But we must “strive to construe a statute and its subsections as a consistent and harmonious whole.”
State v. Stocks 258 P.3d 208 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2011
State v. Stocks 258 P.3d 208 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2011
Short v. Dewald 244 P.3d 92 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2010
Short v. Dewald 244 P.3d 92 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2010
However, when construing a statute, “we examine its individual provisions in the context of the entire statute to achieve a consistent interpretation.” ¶ 13 , (quotation omitted); , (“We strive to construe a statute and its subsections as a consistent and harmonious whole.”).
County of La Paz v. Yakima Compost Co. 233 P.3d 1169 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2010
County of La Paz v. Yakima Compost Co. 233 P.3d 1169 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2010
¶ 20 , cf. Emmett McLoughlin Realty, ¶ 18 , (“passage of a zoning ordinance is the exercise of a legislative function”); , (“Defining crimes and fixing penalties are legislative ...
Excell Agent Services, L.L.C. v. Arizona Department of Revenue 209 P.3d 1052 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2008
Excell Agent Services, L.L.C. v. Arizona Department of Revenue 209 P.3d 1052 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2008
We also “strive to construe a statute and its subsections as a consistent and harmonious whole.”
State v. Barragan-Sierra 196 P.3d 879 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2008
State v. Barragan-Sierra 196 P.3d 879 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2008
(“Defining crimes and fixing penalties are legislative, not judicial, functions.”); see also A.R.S.
Dowling v. Stapley 179 P.3d 960 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2008
Dowling v. Stapley 179 P.3d 960 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2008
(“We strive to construe a statute and its subsections as a consistent and harmonious whole.”) (citation omitted).
Manuel M. v. Ades, Leila M., Alayena M. Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2008
Manuel M. v. Ades, Leila M., Alayena M. Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2008
(principles of statutory construction used to interpret court rules); (“We strive to construe a statute and its subsections as a consistent and harmonious whole.”).
State v. Hasson 177 P.3d 301 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2008
State v. Hasson 177 P.3d 301 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2008
State v. Thomas 175 P.3d 71 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2008
State v. Thomas 175 P.3d 71 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2008
“We strive to construe a statute and its subsections as a consistent and harmonious whole.” State v. Wagstaff , (citation omitted).
State of Arizona v. Francisco Lazaro Gonzalez, Jr. Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2007
State of Arizona v. Francisco Lazaro Gonzalez, Jr. Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2007
492, 125 (1990) (“Defining crimes and fixing penalties are legislative, not judicial, functions.
State v. Gomez 127 P.3d 873 Ariz. 2006
State v. Berger 103 P.3d 298 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2004
State v. Berger 103 P.3d 298 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2004
(“Defining crimes and fixing penalties are legislative, not judicial, functions.”); id.
State v. Davis 79 P.3d 64 Ariz. 2003
State of Arizona v. Victor David Rodriguez Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2003
State of Arizona v. Victor David Rodriguez Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2003
Ultimately, “[o]ur objective in interpreting a statute is to give effect to the legislative intent behind the statute and, when possible, to harmonize all its sections.” (“We strive to construe a statute and its subsections as a consistent and harmonious whole.”).
State v. Casey 71 P.3d 351 Ariz. 2003
State v. Casey 71 P.3d 351 Ariz. 2003
CONSTITUTIONALITY ANALYSIS ¶ 11 “Statutes are presumed constitutional and the burden of proof is on the opponent of the statute to show it infringes upon a constitutional guarantee or violates a constitutional principle.”
Boynton v. Anderson 66 P.3d 88 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2003
Boynton v. Anderson 66 P.3d 88 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2003
-91 , -24 (1990), our supreme court wrote: The legislature’s purpose in enacting the Dangerous Crimes Against Children Act can be surmised.
State v. Navarro 34 P.3d 971 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2001
State v. Navarro 34 P.3d 971 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2001
¶23 We first note that “[djefming crimes and fixing penalties are legislative, not judicial, functions.”
Unum Life Insurance Co. of America v. Craig 26 P.3d 510 Ariz. 2001
Unum Life Insurance Co. of America v. Craig 26 P.3d 510 Ariz. 2001
State of Arizona v. Powers 23 P.3d 668 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2001
State of Arizona v. Powers 23 P.3d 668 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2001
In Re Leon G. 18 P.3d 169 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2001
In Re Leon G. 18 P.3d 169 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2001
is limited by the constitutionally decreed separation of powers that prohibits this Court from enacting legislation or redrafting defective statutes.”
True v. Stewart 18 P.3d 707 Ariz. 2001
True v. Stewart 18 P.3d 707 Ariz. 2001
Rineer v. Leonardo 977 P.2d 767 Ariz. 1999
Rineer v. Leonardo 977 P.2d 767 Ariz. 1999
State v. Lefevre 972 P.2d 1021 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1998
State v. Lefevre 972 P.2d 1021 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1998
See Maricopa County Juvenile Action No. JT9065297, , ( , ).
State v. Brown 952 P.2d 746 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1997
State v. Brown 952 P.2d 746 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1997
its plain meaning unless impossible or absurd consequences would result.”
State v. Trachtman 947 P.2d 905 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1997
State v. Trachtman 947 P.2d 905 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1997
“When an ordinance’s language is unclear, we strive to give it a sensible construction and, if possible, uphold the ordinance.” In re Maricopa County, Juvenile Action No. JT9065297, , ( , ).
State v. Jackson 924 P.2d 494 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1996