Cited by

unctive, hence a finding of any one of those three factors suffices to constitute an aggravating circumstance.” Walton, 159 Ariz. at 587 (internal citation omitted); see also, (“The heinous, cruel, or depraved circumstance is phrased in the disjunctive, so if any one of the three factors is found, the circumstance is satisfied.”); (“The 69 STATE OF ARIZONA V. EDWARD LITTLETON MCCAULEY JUSTICE BOLICK, Concurring legislature phrased the ‘heinous, cruel or depraved’ .

In doing so, we consider the facts in “a light most favorable to sustaining the trial court’s finding.”

In State v. Stokley, we stated that “[c]ruelty focuses on the victim.” (contrasting that “[h]einousness and depravity” go to the “mental state and attitude” of the defendant “as reflected by his words or actions” ()).

The change of plea hearing transcript reflects Offutt “displayed normal communication skills and thought processes” and demonstrated “an understanding of his rights and the consequences of his waiver.”

160 Ariz. at 175; (citing Carver and Valdez and addressing IAC claim on appeal only because “the record clearly demonstrate[d] that the claim [was] meritless”).

§ 13-755(A) (“The supreme court shall review all death sentences.”); (holding that a capital defendant “may neither circumvent nor restrict the mandatory appeal to this court provided for him pursuant to the state’s capital-sentencing procedures”).

(“[T]he trial court is presumed to know and follow the law.” (citation omitted)); (stating that the reviewing court presumes the trial judge is aware of the rules of evidence).

We have stated that “we will not uphold a guilty plea, where competency has been a valid issue, absent a proper finding of competency.” (“A criminal defendant is not competent to plead guilty if [his] mental illness has substantially impaired his ability to make a reasoned choice among the alternatives presented to him and understand the nature of the consequences of his plea.” (internal quotation marks

¶117 At most, Prince proved that he has a personality disorder, not that “the disorder controlled [his] conduct.” -06, -03 (1992) (concluding “[d]efendant’s borderline personality disorder [did] not warrant a reduction of his sentence to life imprisonment”); (“Even if [the defendant] became enraged when confront

-02, -99 (1992) (finding the strangulation victim suffered physical pain from the injuries to her eye and the numerous bruises and abrasions on her body).

denied, 128 S. Ct. 466 (2007); see 34 -94, - 91 (1992) (discussing the Court’s duty to carefully review all death sentences on direct appeal and correct illegal sentences).

Djerf, 191 Ariz. at 594, ¶ 35 , 959 P.2d at 1285 ( , ).

(“[T]he trial court’s failure to impose a legal sentence is one of those rare situations from which the state can seek review even if it failed to object in the trial court.”); n. 4 , (appellate court’s power to correct illegally lenient sentence predicated upon appeal filed by State); , (A sentence that does not fall within our statutory scheme is unlawful; in this context, an order for probation

Kayer, 194 Ariz. at 433 , 984 P.2d at 41 ¶ 28 ( , ).

¶ 52 The analysis of heinousness and depravity “focus[es] on the defendant’s mental state and attitude as reflected by his words and actions.”

172 Ariz. at 201 , 836 P.2d at 414 ; 3 , (holding that defendant could not be charged with first degree murder of fetus in light of fetal manslaughter statute).

(stating that “personality or character disorders usually are not sufficient to satisfy [the (G)(1) ] statutory mitigator”); , (“Generally, g. mere character or personality disorder alone is insufficient to constitute a mitigating circumstance.”).

Summerlin, 138 Ariz. at 435-36 , 675 P.2d at 696-97 .