Cited by
Opinions in Arizona that cite State v. Georgeoff, 788 P.2d 1185.
- Faith P. v. Dcs, L.E. Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
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Faith P. v. Dcs, L.E.
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
Sec., ¶ 16 (App. 2014) ( and 3 Absent material changes from the relevant date, we cite the current version of rules and statutes.
- Shirley R. v. Dcs Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
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Shirley R. v. Dcs
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
(explaining that “[e]ven constitutional rights may, of course, be waived”).
- Shawanee S. v. Arizona Department of Economic Security 319 P.3d 236 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
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Shawanee S. v. Arizona Department of Economic Security
319 P.3d 236
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
(explaining that “[e]ven constitutional rights may, of course, be waived”); n.2, n.2 (App. 2011) (explaining individuals may forfeit or waive some constitutional rights through their conduct).
- State v. Soto 224 P.3d 223 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2010
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State v. Soto
224 P.3d 223
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2010
It is an abuse of the process to clog an already crowded docket with appeals that could easily be resolved under the Rule 32 process.” -15 , -74 (1989); , , 1188 *411 (1990) (breach of plea agreement cannot be raised first by direct appeal but may be raised by Rule 32); Crowder, 155 Ariz. at 479 , 747 P.2d at 1178 (Rule 32 “proper procedure” to challenge validity of plea agreement).
- State v. Preston 4 P.3d 1004 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2000
- State v. Preston 4 P.3d 1004 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2000
- State v. Brown 936 P.2d 181 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1997
- State v. Brown 936 P.2d 181 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1997
- State v. Jimenez 935 P.2d 920 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1996
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State v. Jimenez
935 P.2d 920
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1996
our supreme court commented on the large number of direct appeals from plea agreement proceedings, stating: “The appellate process is taxed enough with the volume of cases that pose serious questions for resolution.
- State v. Baca 926 P.2d 528 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1996
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State v. Baca
926 P.2d 528
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1996
It is an abuse of the process to clog an already crowded docket with appeals that could easily be resolved under the Rule 32 process.’ ” -38 , -89 (1990)).
- State v. Flemming 907 P.2d 496 Ariz. 1995
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State v. Flemming
907 P.2d 496
Ariz. 1995
and by the Arizona Constitution”); , , (same); , (holding that, although Morrissey requires a revocation hearing within a reasonable time after the probationer is taken into custody, delay was not unwarranted where it was the result of logistical difficulties betwe
- State v. Sasak 871 P.2d 729 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1993
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State v. Sasak
871 P.2d 729
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1993
-37 , -88 (1990) (breach of plea agreement not fundamental error that can be originally raised on appeal).
- State v. Wilson 851 P.2d 863 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1993
- State v. Wilson 851 P.2d 863 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1993
- State v. Lewus 825 P.2d 471 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1992
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State v. Lewus
825 P.2d 471
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1992
the state argues that if defendant wished to challenge the amount of restitution he should have done *415 so in his petition for post-conviction relief.
- State Ex Rel. Romley v. Superior Court 812 P.2d 985 Ariz. 1991
- State Ex Rel. Romley v. Superior Court 812 P.2d 985 Ariz. 1991
- Hovey v. Superior Court 798 P.2d 416 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1990
- Hovey v. Superior Court 798 P.2d 416 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1990
- State v. Ross 804 P.2d 112 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1990
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State v. Ross
804 P.2d 112
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1990
2543 , 81 L.Ed.2d 437 (1984) (a defendant who is not fairly apprised of the consequences of a plea can challenge the plea under the due process clause)