Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite State v. Korzep, 799 P.2d 831.

193 citing documents.

Swift Transportation Co. v. Maricopa County 236 P.3d 1209 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2010
Swift Transportation Co. v. Maricopa County 236 P.3d 1209 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2010
Progressive Casualty Insurance v. Estate of Palomera-Ruiz 231 P.3d 384 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2010
Progressive Casualty Insurance v. Estate of Palomera-Ruiz 231 P.3d 384 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2010
§ 1-215(46) (2002 & Supp.2009), defines “writing” only as “includes printing.” Words in statutes are given “their usual and commonly understood meaning unless the legislature clearly intended a different meaning.”
Industrial Commission v. Old Republic Insurance 219 P.3d 285 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
Industrial Commission v. Old Republic Insurance 219 P.3d 285 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
We will give effect to each word or phrase and apply the “usual and commonly understood meaning unless the legislature clearly intended a different meaning.” -65, ¶ 11 , -72 (2003) (quoting State v. Korzep, *78 , ).
State Ex Rel. Thomas v. Duncan 216 P.3d 1194 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
State Ex Rel. Thomas v. Duncan 216 P.3d 1194 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
We must also give effect to each word or phrase and apply the “usual and commonly understood meaning unless the legislature clearly intended a different meaning.” -65, ¶ 11 , -72 (2003) ( , ).
State v. Dann 207 P.3d 604 Ariz. 2009
State v. Dann 207 P.3d 604 Ariz. 2009
State v. Korzep, 165 Ariz. 490, 493
Egan v. Fridlund-Horne 211 P.3d 1213 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
Jones v. Paniagua 212 P.3d 133 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
Jones v. Paniagua 212 P.3d 133 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
at 464-65, ¶ 11 , 80 P.3d at 271 -72 ( , ).
Dowling v. Stapley 179 P.3d 960 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2008
Dowling v. Stapley 179 P.3d 960 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2008
1800 OCOTILLO, LLC v. WLB Group, Inc. 176 P.3d 33 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2008
1800 OCOTILLO, LLC v. WLB Group, Inc. 176 P.3d 33 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2008
Black’s Law Dictionary 429, 737, 772 (7th ed.1999); , (holding that unless legislature gives special meaning to a statutory word, court gives word ordinary meaning); , 470 n. 3, , 911 n. 3 (1983) (stating that in determining ordinary meaning of a word a court may refer to established and widely use
State v. Taylor 166 P.3d 118 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
State v. Taylor 166 P.3d 118 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
Scott Douglas Nordstrom v. State of Arizona 142 P.3d 1247 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2006
Scott Douglas Nordstrom v. State of Arizona 142 P.3d 1247 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2006
“Our primary goal in construing a statute is to determine and give effect to the legislature’s intent.”
Gamez v. Industrial Com'n of Arizona 141 P.3d 794 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2006
Schuck & Sons Construction v. Industrial Commission 138 P.3d 1201 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2006
Schuck & Sons Construction v. Industrial Commission 138 P.3d 1201 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2006
(When interpreting a statute, “[w]e give words their usual and commonly understood meaning unless the legislature clearly intended a different meaning.”).
City of Tucson v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc. 105 P.3d 1163 Ariz. 2005
Lyons v. State Board of Equalization 104 P.3d 867 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2005
Lyons v. State Board of Equalization 104 P.3d 867 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2005
State v. Barraza 104 P.3d 172 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2005
State v. Barraza 104 P.3d 172 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2005
Western Corrections Group, Inc. v. Tierney 96 P.3d 1070 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2004
Western Corrections Group, Inc. v. Tierney 96 P.3d 1070 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2004
State v. Garfield 92 P.3d 905 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2004
State v. Garfield 92 P.3d 905 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2004
(resident need not wait until assailant enters home to use force against assailant); , (resident entitled to § 13 — 411 instruction when force used to prevent crime by coresident); , (person staying in motel room is resident of room and entitled to § 13-411 instruction)
Riepe v. Riepe 91 P.3d 312 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2004
Bridgestone Firestone North America Tire v. A.P.S. Rent a Car & Leasing Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2004
Bridgestone Firestone North America Tire v. A.P.S. Rent a Car & Leasing Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2004
¶58 In construing a statute, “[w]e give words their usual and commonly understood meaning unless the legislature clearly intended a different meaning.” see also A.R.S.
Morgan v. Carillon Investments, Inc. 88 P.3d 1159 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2004
Morgan v. Carillon Investments, Inc. 88 P.3d 1159 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2004
Jangula v. Arizona Property & Casualty Insurance Guaranty Fund 88 P.3d 182 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2004
Jangula v. Arizona Property & Casualty Insurance Guaranty Fund 88 P.3d 182 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2004
In Re Nelson 86 P.3d 374 Ariz. 2004
In Re Nelson 86 P.3d 374 Ariz. 2004
The term “costs” is not defined by Rule 18, thus we must apply its “usual and commonly understood meaning unless the legislature clearly intended a different meaning.” ( ).
State v. Vogel 85 P.3d 497 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2004
State v. Vogel 85 P.3d 497 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2004
“The primary rule of statutory interpretation is to determine and give effect to the legislative intent behind the statute.”
Bilke v. State 80 P.3d 269 Ariz. 2003
Bilke v. State 80 P.3d 269 Ariz. 2003
In giving effect to every word or phrase, the court must assign to the language its “usual and commonly understood meaning unless the legislature clearly intended a different meaning.”
State v. Hazlett 73 P.3d 1258 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2003
State v. Hazlett 73 P.3d 1258 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2003
State v. Christian 66 P.3d 1241 Ariz. 2003
State v. Christian 66 P.3d 1241 Ariz. 2003
¶12 Such an interpretation flies in the face of the normal use of the word “listed.” (“We give words their usual and commonly understood meaning unless the legislature clearly intended a different meaning.”).