Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite State v. Kiles, 857 P.2d 1212.

69 citing documents.

  • State v. Reed 501 P.3d 748 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2021
  • State v. Reed 501 P.3d 748 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2021
    But “attempt is a specific intent crime and by definition involves intentional conduct.”
  • State of Arizona v. Shawn Patrick Lynch 357 P.3d 119 Ariz. 2015
  • State of Arizona v. Shawn Patrick Lynch 357 P.3d 119 Ariz. 2015
    State v. Kiles (Kiles I)
  • State v. Prince 250 P.3d 1145 Ariz. 2011
  • State v. Prince 250 P.3d 1145 Ariz. 2011
    21 (victims heard one assailant order the other to kill one victim); (victim heard the assailants discuss killing him), or when the victim experiences “uncertainty about her ultimate fate,” Hargrave, 225 Ariz. at 17 ¶ 70, 234 P.3d at 585 (quoting State v. Kiles (Kiles I), 857 P.2d, 1212, 1225 (1993)).
  • State v. Hargrave 234 P.3d 569 Ariz. 2010
  • State v. Hargrave 234 P.3d 569 Ariz. 2010
    Mental anguish “includes a victim’s uncertainty about her ultimate fate.” State v. Kiles, 175 Ariz. 358, 371
  • State v. Kiles 213 P.3d 174 Ariz. 2009
  • State v. Kiles 213 P.3d 174 Ariz. 2009
    See State v. Kiles (Kiles I), P.2d 1212 (1993).
  • State v. Bearup 211 P.3d 684 Ariz. 2009
  • State v. Bearup 211 P.3d 684 Ariz. 2009
    “Mental anguish includes a victim’s uncertainty about [his] ultimate fate.”
  • State v. Moore 189 P.3d 1107 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2008
  • State v. Moore 189 P.3d 1107 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2008
    § 13-1001 (defining the offense of attempt); , (“[A]ttempt is a specific intent crime and by definition involves intentional conduct.”); , (“[I] n order to commit an ‘attempt’ a defendant must have an intent to perform acts and to achieve a result which, if accompl
  • State v. Anderson 111 P.3d 369 Ariz. 2005
  • State v. Anderson 111 P.3d 369 Ariz. 2005
    (finding “cruelty” when victim experienced pain and uncertainty about his fate); -72 , -26 (1993) (finding “cruelty” when victim received numerous injuries from prolonged beating).
  • State v. Carlson 48 P.3d 1180 Ariz. 2002
  • State v. Carlson 48 P.3d 1180 Ariz. 2002
    In State v. Trostle, we said that “[c]ruelty exists if the victim consciously experienced physical or mental pain prior to death, and Defendant knew or should have known that suffering would occur.” , (citing State v. (Rudi) Apelt, , , ).
  • State v. Jones 4 P.3d 345 Ariz. 2000
  • State v. Jones 4 P.3d 345 Ariz. 2000
  • State v. Kayer 984 P.2d 31 Ariz. 1999
  • State v. Kayer 984 P.2d 31 Ariz. 1999
    See Jones, 185 Ariz. at 491 , 917 P.2d at 220 (mental health disorders); -19 , -15 (1994) (intoxication); , (intoxieation/substance abuse); Brewer, 170 Ariz. at 505 , 826 P.2d at 802 (character and personality disorders weighed as nonstatutory mitigating evidence).
  • State v. White 982 P.2d 819 Ariz. 1999
  • State v. White 982 P.2d 819 Ariz. 1999
  • State v. Smith 974 P.2d 431 Ariz. 1999
  • State v. Smith 974 P.2d 431 Ariz. 1999
  • State v. Sharp 973 P.2d 1171 Ariz. 1999
  • State v. Sharp 973 P.2d 1171 Ariz. 1999
  • State v. Doerr 969 P.2d 1168 Ariz. 1998
  • State v. Doerr 969 P.2d 1168 Ariz. 1998
    ing a shooting, , two blows to the head with a bat followed by smothering and strangulation, -89 , -18 (1996); numerous gunshot wounds to the head from different weapons, , continued bludgeoning with a tire jack, , and bruises, scraping or cutting injuries, a wound to the head, deep slashes to the throat, and strangulation
  • State v. Trostle 951 P.2d 869 Ariz. 1997
  • State v. Trostle 951 P.2d 869 Ariz. 1997
    Cruelty exists if the victim consciously experienced physical or mental pain prior to death, , and the defendant knew or should have known that suffering would occur.
  • State v. Spreitz 945 P.2d 1260 Ariz. 1997
  • State v. Spreitz 945 P.2d 1260 Ariz. 1997
    In our review, we have been mindful that the sentencing judge must consider “any aspect of the defendant’s character or record and any circumstance of the offense relevant to determining whether the death penalty should be imposed.” , (internal quotations omitted).
  • State v. Rogovich 932 P.2d 794 Ariz. 1997
  • State v. Rogovich 932 P.2d 794 Ariz. 1997
  • State v. Soto-Fong 928 P.2d 610 Ariz. 1996
  • State v. Soto-Fong 928 P.2d 610 Ariz. 1996
    609 , 126 L.Ed.2d 574 (1993); , cert.
  • State v. Dickens 926 P.2d 468 Ariz. 1996
  • State v. Dickens 926 P.2d 468 Ariz. 1996
  • State v. Thompson 924 P.2d 1048 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1996
  • State v. Thompson 924 P.2d 1048 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1996
    See, -30 , -51 (1994); -70 , -24 (1993); -50 , -83 (1990).
  • State v. Miller 921 P.2d 1151 Ariz. 1996
  • State v. Miller 921 P.2d 1151 Ariz. 1996
    As we said in State v. Kiles, “[w]e refuse to equate defendant’s unwillingness to control his actions with his inability to do so.” , cert.
  • State v. Towery 920 P.2d 290 Ariz. 1996
  • State v. Towery 920 P.2d 290 Ariz. 1996
  • State v. Jones 917 P.2d 200 Ariz. 1996
  • State v. Jones 917 P.2d 200 Ariz. 1996
    Moreover, we have held that “when a victim is bludgeoned to death, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim experienced pain before losing consciousness.” , cert.
  • State v. Medrano 914 P.2d 225 Ariz. 1996
  • State v. Medrano 914 P.2d 225 Ariz. 1996
    It thus appears that drug use did not “overwhelm[ ] his ability to control his physical behavior.” , cert.