Cited by

There are two forms of impermissible prosecutorial vouching: “(1) when the prosecutor places the prestige of the government behind its witness, and (2) where the prosecutor suggests that information not presented to the jury supports the witness’s testimony.” (quotation and citation omitted).

applies when a defendant fails to object to alleged trial error.”) ().

The state bears “the burden of convincing us that error is harmless.”

(concluding prosecutor improperly reminded jurors that victim’s wife was awaiting the verdict, that her “life is totally destroyed” and that “she wants justice”); (“A jury in a criminal trial is not expected to strike some sort of balance between the victim’s and the defendant’s rights.”).

Mueller claims the State’s objections did so by placing the prestige of the government behind its witness, thereby providing personal assurances the truthfulness of a witness

(“Error, be it constitutional or otherwise, is 4 Defendant does not argue that the given instruction misstates the law.

is not whether, in a trial that occurred without the error, a guilty verdict would surely have been rendered, but whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error.” (citations omitted).

Nonetheless, the appellate standard parallels the evidentiary standard required to convict: “We must be confident beyond a reasonable doubt that the error had no influence on the jury’s judgment.”

(citation omitted); see also King, 180 Ariz. at 278, 883 P.2d at 1034.

(stating a party waives error in the jury selection process unless the party objects before the jury was impaneled); (stating that, absent fundamental error, a party has waived any error raised for the first time on appeal).

¶¶ 10–11 (quoting United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 612 (1976) (Burger, C.J., concurring) –02, –05 (1993)).

Tucker, 290 P.3d at 1261.

(“Opening statement is not a time to argue the inferences and conclusions that may be drawn from evidence not yet admitted.”) (citing Charles M. Smith, Arizona Practice — Civil Trial Practice § 455, at 395 (1986)).

“A trial judge must control the courtroom to help ensure a fair trial” and “must refrain from taking any action calculated to influence the jury or likely to prejudice the defendant,” but “[w]ithin reason, a judge does not display bias or cause prejudice when acting sua sponte to control the courtroom and the trial.”

(-54 (1973), -71 (1967), ).

whether direct or indirect, violates state and federal constitutional law) (); Corrales, 138 Ariz. at 591, “[p]rosecutorial misconduct is harmless error if we can find beyond a reasonable doubt that it did not contribute to or affect the verdict.” Hughes, 193 Ariz. at 80, ¶ 32 ( ).