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Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite State v. Western, 812 P.2d 987.

40 citing documents.

  • State v. Mitchell Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2024
  • State v. Mitchell Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2024
    (“The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment does not permit the state to deprive a person of liberty for violating a statute whose terms are so vague, indefinite and uncertain that their meaning cannot be reasonably ascertained.”) (cleaned up).
  • Az Petition Partners LLC v. Hon. thompson/state 530 P.3d 1144 Ariz. 2023
  • Az Petition Partners LLC v. Hon. thompson/state 530 P.3d 1144 Ariz. 2023
    First, vagueness: the statute’s “terms are ‘so vague, indefinite, and uncertain’ that their meaning cannot be reasonably ascertained.” (internal citation omitted).
  • State v. Padilla Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2022
  • State v. Padilla Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2022
    (“The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment does not permit the state to deprive a person of liberty for violating a statute whose terms are so vague, indefinite and uncertain that their meaning cannot be reasonably ascertained.”) (citation omitted).
  • State of Arizona v. Lynn Lavern Burbey Ariz. 2017
  • State of Arizona v. Lynn Lavern Burbey Ariz. 2017
  • State v. Denson 382 P.3d 1221 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
  • State v. Denson 382 P.3d 1221 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
    ¶9 “The [D]ue [P]rocess [C]lause of the [Fourteenth [AJmendment does not permit the state to deprive a person of liberty for violating a statute whose terms are ‘so vague, indefinite and uncertain’ that their meaning cannot be reasonably ascertained.” , (citation omitted).
  • State v. Burke 360 P.3d 118 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
  • State v. Burke 360 P.3d 118 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
    VAGUENESS ¶6 “The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment does not permit the state to deprive a person of liberty for violating a statute whose terms are ‘so vague, indefinite and uncertain’ that their meaning cannot be reasonably ascertained.” (citation omitted).
  • Crowell v. Jejna 161 P.3d 577 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
  • Crowell v. Jejna 161 P.3d 577 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
    ¶ 15 Common-law indecent exposure requires a “wil[l]ful exposure of the person in a public place in the presence of others.” -78 , -11 (1973) ( , 173 n. 3, , 991 n. 3 (1991)); see Longbridge Inv.
  • State v. Soltero 71 P.3d 370 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2003
  • State v. Soltero 71 P.3d 370 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2003
  • Empress Adult Video & Bookstore v. City of Tucson 59 P.3d 814 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2002
  • Empress Adult Video & Bookstore v. City of Tucson 59 P.3d 814 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2002
    in which our supreme court held that the First Amendment protects “non-obscene dancing at locations that do not serve alcohol”; , (“even nude dancing enjoys some protection” under First Amendment); Wortham v. City o
  • State v. McMahon 38 P.3d 1213 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2002
  • State v. McMahon 38 P.3d 1213 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2002
  • State v. Evenson 33 P.3d 780 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2001
  • State v. Evenson 33 P.3d 780 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2001
    A law violates due process and is void on its face if “it is so vague that persons of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.” Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 12-31, at 1033 (2d ed.1988)
  • Norgord v. State Ex Rel. Berning 33 P.3d 1166 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2001
  • Norgord v. State Ex Rel. Berning 33 P.3d 1166 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2001
    disapproved in part on other grounds, , 173 n. 3, , 991 n. 3 (1991).
  • Stulce v. SALT RIVER PROJECT AGRICULTURAL IMPROVEMENT AND POWER DISTRICT 3 P.3d 1007 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1999
  • Stulce v. SALT RIVER PROJECT AGRICULTURAL IMPROVEMENT AND POWER DISTRICT 3 P.3d 1007 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1999
  • State v. Musser 954 P.2d 1053 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1998
  • State v. Musser 954 P.2d 1053 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1998
  • State v. Singer 945 P.2d 359 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1997
  • State v. Singer 945 P.2d 359 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1997
  • State v. Ochoa 943 P.2d 814 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1997
  • State v. Ochoa 943 P.2d 814 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1997
  • State v. McLamb 932 P.2d 266 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1996
  • State v. McLamb 932 P.2d 266 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1996
    Thus, -to prevail on an overbreadth claim, “[tjhere must be a realistic danger that the statute will significantly jeopardize recognized first amendment protections of individuals not before the court.” Steiger, 162 Ariz. at 144 , 781 P.2d at 622 (citation omitted) (emphasis original); , (ordinance prohibiting striptease performances substantially overbroad because prohibited broad range of legitimate artistic expression); , (theft-by-extortion statute substantially overbroad because it criminal
  • State v. Savio 924 P.2d 491 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1996
  • State v. Savio 924 P.2d 491 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1996
    where the Arizona Supreme Court struck down an anti-striptease ordinance with similar language because it failed to narrow the *489 prohibited conduct.
  • City of Tucson v. Wolfe 917 P.2d 706 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1995
  • City of Tucson v. Wolfe 917 P.2d 706 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1995
    (freedom of expression).
  • State v. Jones 865 P.2d 138 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1993
  • State v. Jones 865 P.2d 138 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1993
    (citing Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 , 92 S.Ct.