Cited by
Opinions in Arizona that cite State v. Ramirez, 871 P.2d 237.
- State v. Spriggs Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
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State v. Spriggs
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 618-19 (1976); (citations omitted).
- State v. Chevalier Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
- State v. Chevalier Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
- In re Jessie T. 399 P.3d 103 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
- Viniegra v. Town of Parker Municipal Property Corp. 383 P.3d 665 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
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Viniegra v. Town of Parker Municipal Property Corp.
383 P.3d 665
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
The rational basis test applies to statutes that “do not affect the fundamental right to [sue] but merely regulate it.”
- State v. Boudreau Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
- State v. Boudreau Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
- State v. Yashar Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
- State v. Yashar Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
- State v. Jacobs Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
- State v. Jacobs Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
- State v. Hudson Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
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State v. Hudson
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
rosecutor commented on Hudson’s request for an attorney, “essentially vouching for the Detective and his method of interviewing,” and the prosecutor “used Hudson’s statements to establish [Hudson’s mens rea] in her closing.” ¶13 It is well established that “a prosecutor may not comment on a defendant's post-arrest, post-Miranda warnings silence as evidence of guilt.” 8 A prosecutor may, however, “comment on a defendant's post-Miranda warning statements ‘because a defendant who voluntarily speaks
- State v. Bustos Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
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State v. Bustos
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
A person is in custody when he is under arrest or when his “freedom of movement is restrained to a degree associated with formal arrest.”
- State v. Cahill Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
- State v. Cahill Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
- State of Arizona v. Andre Michael Leteve 354 P.3d 393 Ariz. 2015
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State of Arizona v. Andre Michael Leteve
354 P.3d 393
Ariz. 2015
Whether questioning falls within the public safety exception turns on “whether there was an objectively reasonable need to protect the police or the public from any immediate danger.” (quoting United States v. Brady, 819 F.2d 884, 888 n.3 (9th Cir. 1987)).
- State v. Lombardo Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
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State v. Lombardo
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
(stating that we presume the trial judge knows the law).
- State v. Cooper Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
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State v. Cooper
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
(“We presume that the jurors read and followed the relevant instructions.”).
- State v. Cotham Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
- State v. Cotham Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
- State v. Young Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
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State v. Young
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
“know (or have cognizance) of the item which he is accused of having dominion or control over.” ¶15 “When the jury appears to be confused about a legal issue, and the resolution of the question is not apparent from an earlier instruction, the trial judge has a responsibility to give the jury the required guidance by a lucid statement of the relevant legal criteria.” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
- State of Arizona v. Adolfo Noel Ruiz, Jr. Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2014
- State of Arizona v. Adolfo Noel Ruiz, Jr. Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2014
- State v. Winterton Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
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State v. Winterton
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
(“[T]he trial court is presumed to know and follow the law.” (citation omitted)); (stating that the reviewing court presumes the trial judge is aware of the rules of evidence).
- State v. Melville Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
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State v. Melville
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
Consequently, “[w]hen a jury asks a judge about a matter on which it has received adequate instruction, the judge may in his or her discretion refuse to answer, or may refer the jury to the earlier instruction.”
- State v. Ramos 330 P.3d 987 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
- State v. Ramos 330 P.3d 987 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
- State v. Varela Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
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State v. Varela
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
.”); (“[T]here is no presumption that jurors will disobey instructions given them by the court.” (citation omitted)).
- State v. Johnson Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
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State v. Johnson
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
Indeed, under these circumstances, the court had a “responsibility to give the jury the required guidance by a lucid statement of the relevant legal criteria.” ( and Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U.S. 607, 612-13 (1946)).
- State of Arizona v. Ronnie Lovelle Joseph 283 P.3d 27 Ariz. 2012
- State of Arizona v. Ronnie Lovelle Joseph 283 P.3d 27 Ariz. 2012
- State v. Pete J. Vanwinkle 285 P.3d 308 Ariz. 2012
- State v. Pete J. Vanwinkle 285 P.3d 308 Ariz. 2012
- State of Arizona v. Francisco Antonio Lopez 279 P.3d 640 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2012
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State of Arizona v. Francisco Antonio Lopez
279 P.3d 640
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2012
And, that “[a] prosecutor may .
- State v. VanWinkle 273 P.3d 1148 Ariz. 2012
- State v. VanWinkle 273 P.3d 1148 Ariz. 2012
- State v. Stevens 267 P.3d 1203 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2012