Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite State v. King, 883 P.2d 1024.

197 citing documents.

  • State v. Cook Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
  • State v. Cook Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
  • State v. Nichols Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
  • State v. Nichols Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
    Opening statements “orient jurors to the pertinent facts that would be presented and [] assist in their understanding of the evidence.” ¶ 94 (2016) ().
  • State v. Tull Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
  • State v. Tull Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
  • State v. Stoneham Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
  • State v. Stoneham Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
    -77 (1994) (citation omitted).
  • State v. MacIas Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
  • State v. MacIas Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
    “The first type of vouching involves personal assurances of a witness’s veracity,” and the second type involves “remarks that bolster a witness’s credibility by reference to materials outside the record.” (quoting United States v. Roberts, 618 F.2d 530, 533 (9th Cir. 1980)).
  • State v. Begay Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
  • State v. Begay Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
    There are “two forms of impermissible prosecutorial vouching: (1) where the prosecutor places the prestige of the government behind its witness; [and] (2) where the prosecutor suggests that information not presented to the jury supports the witness’s testimony.” -77 (1994) (citation omitted).
  • State v. Mueller Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
  • State v. Mueller Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
    Mueller claims the State’s objections did so by placing the prestige of the government behind its witness, thereby providing personal assurances the truthfulness of a witness
  • Cundiff v. Cox Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
  • State v. Price Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
  • State v. Price Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
  • Cundiff v. Cox Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
    The doctrine of law of the case is a rule of procedure, not of substance, and does not prevent a court from changing a ruling merely because the court ruled on a question at an earlier stage of the proceedings; “[n]or does it prevent a different judge, sitting on the same case, from reconsidering the first judge’s prior, nonfinal rulings.” (citations omitted).
  • State v. Boudreau Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
  • State v. Boudreau Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
  • State v. Myers Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
  • State v. Myers Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
    STATE v. MYERS Decision of the Court ¶12 The prosecutor’s initial comment during her opening statement, “He thinks you’re going to let him get away with it because nobody saw him actually take it,” was improper and beyond the scope of appropriate opening statement, given that it was more argumentative than informative, but it was not inflammatory because it was not an appeal to the jurors’ fears or a request to the jury to “send a message” to society.
  • State v. Clary Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
  • State v. Clary Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
    18 STATE v. CLARY Decision of the Court C. Alleged Vouching ¶32 Clary contends the prosecutor impermissibly engaged in vouching by “plac[ing] the prestige of the government behind its witness.” (citation omitted).
  • State of Arizona v. Mark Goudeau 372 P.3d 945 Ariz. 2016
  • State of Arizona v. Mark Goudeau 372 P.3d 945 Ariz. 2016
    (“Opening statements are intended to inform the jury of what the party expects to prove and prepare the jury for the evidence that is to be presented.”).
  • State v. Baker Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
  • State v. Baker Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
    See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 n.9 (2004) (noting that “when the declarant appears for cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause places no constraints at all on the use of his prior testimonial statements.”); (holding that the defendant’s confrontation rights were not violated when a declarant “testified at trial and was subjected to unrestricted cross- examination,” even though the declarant no longer remembered certain details of the crime).
  • State of Arizona v. Kyle Andrew Stoll 370 P.3d 1130 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2016
  • State of Arizona v. Kyle Andrew Stoll 370 P.3d 1130 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2016
    (motion for reconsideration); (motion to suppress).
  • Chasan v. Farmers Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
  • Chasan v. Farmers Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
    ¶ 60 (2008) (); see also Lennar Corp. v. Transamerica Ins.
  • State v. Rivera Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
  • State v. Canales Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
  • State v. Rivera Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
  • State v. Canales Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
  • State v. Loader Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
  • State v. Loader Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
    (quoting United States v. Rogers, 549 F.2d 490, 496 (8th Cir. 1976)).
  • State v. Multari Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
  • State v. Multari Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
    There are “two forms of impermissible prosecutorial vouching: 1) where the prosecutor places the prestige of the government behind its witness; [and] 2) where the prosecutor suggests that information not presented to the jury supports the witness’s testimony.” -77, -33 (1994).
  • State of Arizona v. Craig A. Williamson 343 P.3d 1 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2015
  • State of Arizona v. Craig A. Williamson 343 P.3d 1 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2015
    But his general testimony about why officers in undercover investigations are trained to give persons the opportunity to walk away did not mention Williamson, much less constitute an opinion on his “guilt or innocence or tell[] the jury how it should decide [his] case.” see, ¶¶ 16, 18, -83 (2010) (testimony that drowning was “horrifying experience” and a “10” on “scale of 1 to 10” not improper opinion on ultimate issue whether crime committed in especially cruel manner); Doerr
  • State v. Rozenman Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
  • State v. Rozenman Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
  • State v. Alvarez Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
  • State v. Alvarez Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
    There are “two forms of impermissible prosecutorial vouching: (1) where the prosecutor places the prestige of the government behind its witness; [and] (2) where the prosecutor suggests that information not presented to the jury supports the witness’s testimony.” -77, -33 (1994) (citation omitted).
  • State of Arizona v. David J. Waller 333 P.3d 806 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2014
  • State of Arizona v. David J. Waller 333 P.3d 806 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2014
    “Opening statements are intended to inform the jury of what the party expects to prove and prepare the jury for the evidence that is to be presented.”
  • Kent v. Carter-Kent 332 P.3d 56 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
  • Kent v. Carter-Kent 332 P.3d 56 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014