Cited by
Opinions in Arizona that cite State v. Reynolds, 823 P.2d 681.
- True v. Stewart 18 P.3d 707 Ariz. 2001
- State v. Hoggatt 18 P.3d 1239 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2001
-
State v. Hoggatt
18 P.3d 1239
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2001
¶ 8 Basic principles of statutory interpretation require that we first “seek to discern the intent of the legislature.”
- State v. Samano 11 P.3d 1045 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2000
-
State v. Samano
11 P.3d 1045
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2000
While we must attempt to discern and effectuate the legislature’s intent, , we look to “[t]he language of [the] statute [as] the most reliable evidence of its intent.”
- State v. Petrak 8 P.3d 1174 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2000
-
State v. Petrak
8 P.3d 1174
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2000
If statutory terms are defined, we apply that definition; otherwise, we interpret statutory terms “in accordance with their commonly accepted meanings.”
- Milner v. Colonial Trust Co. 6 P.3d 329 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2000
-
Milner v. Colonial Trust Co.
6 P.3d 329
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2000
Based on the principles of statutory construction, we will “seek to discern the intent of the legislature.”
- State v. Leon 3 P.3d 968 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1999
-
State v. Leon
3 P.3d 968
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1999
When construing a statute, “we seek to discern the intent of the legislature.”
- Matter of Guardianship/Conservatorship of Denton 945 P.2d 1283 Ariz. 1997
- Denton v. Superior Court 945 P.2d 1283 Ariz. 1997
- Matter of Guardianship/Conservatorship of Denton 945 P.2d 1283 Ariz. 1997
- Denton v. Superior Court 945 P.2d 1283 Ariz. 1997
- State v. Riggs 942 P.2d 1159 Ariz. 1997
-
State v. Riggs
942 P.2d 1159
Ariz. 1997
We look primarily to the language of the statute itself and give effect to the statutory terms in accordance with their commonly accepted meanings.”
- Tobel v. State, Dept. of Public Safety 939 P.2d 801 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1997
-
Tobel v. State, Dept. of Public Safety
939 P.2d 801
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1997
We give effect to the statutory language in accordance with its commonly accepted meaning unless the statute provides a definition or “ ‘it appears from the context that a special meaning was intended.’ ” , (quoting Mid Kansas Fed.
- Cutter Aviation, Inc. v. Arizona Department of Revenue 958 P.2d 1 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1997
- Cutter Aviation, Inc. v. Arizona Department of Revenue 958 P.2d 1 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1997
- Dugan v. Fujitsu Business Communications Systems, Inc. 937 P.2d 706 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1997
- Dugan v. Fujitsu Business Communications Systems, Inc. 937 P.2d 706 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1997
- Arizona Department of Economic Security v. Superior Court 923 P.2d 871 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1996
- Arizona Department of Economic Security v. Superior Court 923 P.2d 871 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1996
- Pfeil v. Smith 900 P.2d 12 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1995
- Pfeil v. Smith 900 P.2d 12 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1995
- State Ex Rel. Udall v. Superior Court 904 P.2d 1286 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1995
- State Ex Rel. Udall v. Superior Court 904 P.2d 1286 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1995
- State v. Barr 904 P.2d 1258 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1995
- State v. Barr 904 P.2d 1258 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1995
- State v. Cid 892 P.2d 216 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1995
-
State v. Cid
892 P.2d 216
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1995
§ 1-213, ‘unless the legislature has offered its own definition of the words or it appears from the context that a special meaning was intended.’ , (quoting Mid Kansas Fed.
- Hayes v. Continental Insurance 872 P.2d 668 Ariz. 1994
- Hayes v. Continental Insurance 872 P.2d 668 Ariz. 1994
- Sierra Tucson, Inc. v. Pima County 871 P.2d 762 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1994
- Sierra Tucson, Inc. v. Pima County 871 P.2d 762 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1994
- State v. Nevarez 875 P.2d 184 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1993
- State v. Nevarez 875 P.2d 184 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1993
- State v. Milke 865 P.2d 779 Ariz. 1993
-
State v. Milke
865 P.2d 779
Ariz. 1993
See id.; , (“If a statute’s language is clear and unambiguous, the court will give it effect without resorting to other rules of statutory construction.”); , (“in construing a statute, if the language is plain, there is no occasion for con
- State v. Carnegie 850 P.2d 690 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1993
- State v. Carnegie 850 P.2d 690 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1993
- State v. Johnson 827 P.2d 1134 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1992
- State v. Johnson 827 P.2d 1134 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1992