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However, the defendant must clearly and unambiguously request counsel, articulating the “desire to have counsel present sufficiently clearly that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for an attorney.” Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994); –51 (1994)

¶51 “A trial court need not ‘define every phrase or word used in the [jury] instructions, especially when they are used in their ordinary sense and are commonly understood.’” Forde, 233 Ariz. at 564 ¶ 82 (alteration in original) ().

- 59 (1994) (citation omitted) (holding that when considering a challenge to sufficiency of evidence to support a conviction, the court considers “all the evidence presented in the case,” including any evidence presented by the defendant).

When reviewing the denial of a Rule 20 motion, a court considers “the entire record, including any evidence [the] defendant may have later supplied.” (“After making and losing a motion for a directed verdict, a defendant has the choice of resting on the motion or proceeding with his case.

(“A trial court is not required to define every phrase or word used in the instructions, especially when they are used in their ordinary sense and are commonly understood.”).

se photographs were relevant to illustrate the medical examiner’s testimony, to show the cause of [the 38 STATE V. ALLEN Opinion of the Court victims’] deaths and the similarities of their injuries, and to refute defendant’s claim that another person killed [one of the victims].”); (to same effect).

See Freeney, 223 Ariz. at 115, ¶ 29; (“Defendant is entitled to notice of the crimes with which he may be convicted, not the manner in which the [S]tate will prove his guilt.”).

Id.; (“Defendant is entitled to notice of the crimes with which he may be convicted, not the manner in which the state will prove his guilt.”).

–65, ¶ 82 (2014) (“A trial court need not ‘define every phrase or word used in the [jury] instructions, especially when they are used in their ordinary sense and are commonly understood.’”) ().

Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 462 (1994) (finding the statement “maybe I should talk to a lawyer” was not an unequivocal request for counsel); -51 (1994) (same for the statement “I think I better talk to a lawyer first”); (holding statement that “I’m not going to say anymore until I talk to a lawyer” was an unequivocal request for an attorney that triggered Miranda).

Id.; –51 (1994) (holding that “I think I better talk to a lawyer first” was equivocal); ¶ 29 (2006) (finding that “I think I might want an attorney” was equivocal).

–59, –15 (1994) (noting that a determination of the sufficiency of the evidence includes evidence presented by the defendant).

A trial court need not “define every phrase or word used in the [jury] instructions, especially when they are used in their ordinary sense and are commonly understood.”

(defendant convicted of first-degree burglary but jury did not find 20 offense to be dangerous).

-51, -07 (1994) (suspect must clearly invoke right to counsel).

“[J]uror misconduct warrants a new trial if *202 the defendant shows actual prejudice or if prejudice may be fairly presumed from the facts.” , (citation omitted).

See, e.g., Davis, 512 U.S. at 455, 462 (finding suspect’s equivocal statements, “Maybe I should talk to a lawyer” and “I think I want a lawyer before I say anything else,” did not require questioning to cease); Ellison, 140 P.3d at 910 (deeming “I think I might want an attorney” equivocal request for counsel); -51, -07 (1994) (finding statement “I think I better talk to a lawyer first” insufficient to invoke right to counsel).

Similarly, the Court rejected the defendant’s argument that he had received inadequate notice that kidnapping would be used as a predicate felony when the defendant failed to show either prejudice or unfair surprise.

An objection that is withdrawn is waived, and we thus review only for fundamental error, ¶ 19

“The jury must simply find that the defendant committed or attempted to commit it.”

(even if presiding judge “was personally disqualified, he had no duty to recuse himself from selecting the judge to hear this [capital] case”); (presiding criminal judge, previously removed from case for cause, not disqua

For an invocation of the Miranda right to counsel to be effective, the accused “‘must articulate his desire to have counsel present sufficiently clearly that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for an attorney.’” quoting Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459, 114 S. Ct. 2350, 2355 (1994).