Cited by

27 STATE v. RODRIGUEZ Opinion of the Court n.1 (1995) (circumstantial evidence that victim visited ATM to withdraw $200 was insufficient evidence to show total contents of stolen wallet worth over $1,500).

See, -57 (Ariz. 1995) (trial court abused discretion in failing to preclude pornographic homosexual photographs pursuant to Rule 403 calculus).

r defendant”; “evidence admitted against one defendant has a harmful ‘rub-off effect’ on the other defendant”; “there is a significant disparity in the amount of evidence introduced against each of the two defendants”; “co-defendants present defenses that are so antagonistic that they are mutually exclusive”; or “the conduct of one defendant’s defense harms the other defendant.” (citations omitted), ¶ 12 (2010).

ed against one defendant is facially incriminating to the other defendant; (2) evidence admitted against one defendant has a harmful ‘rub-off effect’ on the other defendant; (3) there is a significant disparity in the amount of evidence introduced against each of the two defendants; or (4) co-defendants present defenses that are so antagonistic that they are mutually exclusive.” (citations omitted).

(stating that “[u]nder A.R.S.

¶40 In arguing the adult pornography was prejudicial other-acts evidence under Rule 404(b)

Severance on such a basis is rare and is required only if the jury is unable to “keep separate the evidence that is relevant to each defendant and render a fair and impartial verdict as to him.” ().

Lawson, 144 Ariz. at 556, 30 698 P.2d at 1275; P.3d 240 (2010).

See, Dumaine, 162 Ariz. at 404, 783 P.2d at 1196

(finding reversible error in trial court’s admission of inflammatory evidence pursuant to Rule 403, Ariz. R. Evid.); , (reversing convictions based on trial court’s failure to grant a severance under state standards); State v. Rodrig

See, , Dumaine, 162 Ariz. at 404 , 783 P.2d at 1196 (self-defense instruction will be given only if defendant can demonstrate “he acted solely because of [the reasonable] belief [of immediate physical danger]”).

-57, -6 (1995), the Arizona Supreme Court found the erroneous admission of pornographic photographs sufficiently prejudicial to justify reversing the first-degree murder convictions of two defendants, one of whom the jury learned “had collected” the pornography, the other of whom might have been onl

The State points out that Barraza’s argument on appeal — , — is not the argument Barraza made to the trial court that additional language should have been inserted telling the jury that “forcible rape is deadly physical force.” Therefore, the State argues that Barraza has both abandoned the argument she made in the trial court, see State v. Nirschel, 155 A

The Arizona Supreme Court rejected a

P. 31.17(d); , 57 n. 1, , 6 n. 1 (1995); -5 , -14 (1988).

Similarly, appellant’s , is misplaced because it, too, is distinguishable.