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The appointment of experts is within the sound discretion of the trial court, and “[a]bsent substantial prejudice, we will not disturb the trial court's refusal to appoint experts.”

The superior court “is in the best position to determine the evidence surrounding the aggravating and mitigating factors[,]” including “which factors should be given credence,” Carbajal, 177 Ariz. at 463, and “the weight to be given that evidence,”

-11 (1995) (advisory counsel and expert witnesses); (investigators).

P 6.1(e), as long as the withdrawal is “unequivocal” and “clear.” ().

(“Gonzalez moved to sever before the start of the first trial, but waived this issue by failing to renew his motion during the second trial or at the close of the evidence.”).

“Absent substantial prejudice, we will not disturb the trial court’s refusal to appoint experts.” (citation omitted).

“Although [a] court must consider relevant evidence offered in mitigation, it is not required to find that evidence to be mitigating.”

(“Although the court must consider relevant evidence offered in mitigation, it is not required to find that evidence to be mitigating.”).

(holding that, “by choosing not to testify, Gonzales waived his right to claim that the trial court erroneously ruled involuntary statements admissible to impeach”); (holding that, because the defendant did not testify, “he may

¶15 Contrary to Duran’s assertion, his decision to not testify—and thus the absence of his statements from the record—renders this inquiry “wholly speculative.” Luce, 469 U.S. at 41; (“[P]rejudice is hypothetical when the defendant does not testify.”).

(stating that defendant did not withdraw his waiver of counsel by asking for advisory counsel and court cannot interfere with self-representation right without an unequivocal waiver); Rickman, 148 Ariz. at 503-04 , 715 P.2d at 756-57 (stating that a defendant's request that advisory cou

(defendant waived issue by failing to renew motion to sever count); , , -400 , -48 (1981); , Pierce, 27 Ariz.App.

(finding that wife confined to 10 feet by 10 feet courtyard with the defendant as he stabbed her husband was in grave risk of death; she attempted to rescue her husband by jumping on the defendant’s back as he was stabbing her husband); State v. Fierro, 166 Ar

(defendant’s failure to object to evidence “on Rule 403 grounds at trial .

(holding that the “reasonably necessary” standard in the statute governing appointment of expert witnesses in capital cases is the same as the threshold showing required under Ake); ¶ 5

To establish the F.3 aggravator, the state must prove that “during the course of the killing, the defendant knowingly engaged in conduct that created a real and substantial likelihood that a specific third person might suffer fatal injuries.” , (citation omitted).

See, (“We hold that by choosing not to testify, Gonzales waived his right to claim that the trial court erroneously ruled involuntary statements 9 admissible to impeach.”); -03, 78

While service may not automatically establish a good faith effort, it does seem to fulfill what has been identified as the ultimate question in these types of cases: “[T]he true issue is whether the state made a good-faith effort to locate the witness so that he or she could be put under subpoena.” , (quoting Edwards, 136 Ariz. at 182 , 665 P.2d at 64 ).

If it does find that the evidence is mitigating, the weight to be given that evidence is within its discretion.”

If it does find that the evidence is mitigating, the weight to be given that evidence is within its discretion.”