Cited by

“We have often emphasized that the statutory expression of ‘especially heinous, cruel, or depraved’ is phrased in the disjunctive, hence a finding of any one of those three factors suffices to constitute an aggravating circumstance.” Walton, 159 Ariz. at 587 (internal citation omitted); see also, (“The heinous, cruel, or depraved circumstance is phrased in the disjunctive, so if any one of the three factors is found, the circumstance is satisfied.”); (“The 69 STATE OF ARIZONA V. EDWARD LITTLETON

(holding the use of “or” in an aggravating circumstance means “if any one of the three factors is found, the circumstance is satisfied”).

ath penalty does not per se constitute cruel and unusual punishment, ¶ 59 (2001), vacated on other grounds, 536 U.S. 953 (2002); (2) that where, as here, a defendant offers no evidence of purposeful discrimination in his own case, he cannot argue that Arizona’s death penalty is discriminatorily imposed against poor, young, and male defendants, (3) that the prosecutor’s discretion to seek the death penalty is not unconstitutional for lack of adequate standards, –61 ¶ 46 (2001), vacated on other g

§ 13-701(E), the court “is not required to accept such evidence,” ¶ 8 (App. 2003) (“[A] sentencing court is not required to find that mitigating circumstances exist merely because mitigating evidence is presented; the court is only required to give the evidence due consideration.”); Carbajal, 177 Ariz. at 463 (“The consider

In State v. Stokley, we stated that “[c]ruelty focuses on the victim.” (contrasting that “[h]einousness and depravity” go to the “mental state and attitude” of the defendant “as reflected by his words or actions” ()).

(holding “repetitive gripping” of ligature and other indications of a struggle evidenced especial cruelty), with Snelling, 225 Ariz. at 189 ¶¶ 31-32, 236 P.3d at 416 (finding no mental anguish when no evidence of a struggle, and “only a single ligature mark”), and State v. Jimenez, 165 A

Sansing, 200 Ariz. at 361, ¶ 46, 26 P.3d at 1132

(noting “evidence of repetitive gripping of [the strangulation victim’s] neck” as one possible indicator of a struggle).

See State v. Stokley, 182 Ariz. 505, 523, (“[W]here the difference in sentences is a result of appropriate plea bargaining, it may not - 27 - be considered in mitigation.”).

Sansing, 200 Ariz. at 361, ¶ 46, 26 P.3d at 1132; ¶ 53

(quoting Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 653 (1990), ).

2791, 2800 , 49 L.Ed.2d 683 (1976) (courts rarely presume prejudice due to outrageous pretrial publicity))

See Spears, 184 Ariz. at 294 , 908 P.2d at 1079

Martinez, 196 Ariz. at 465 , 999 P.2d at 809 ¶ 63; Jones, 185 Ariz. at 490 , 917 P.2d at 219