Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite State v. Miller, 875 P.2d 788.

76 citing documents.

State of Arizona v. Douglas Lee Eddington 266 P.3d 1057 Ariz. 2011
State of Arizona v. Douglas Lee Eddington 266 P.3d 1057 Ariz. 2011
Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961); accord State v. Miller, 178 Ariz. 555, 557
State v. Prince 250 P.3d 1145 Ariz. 2011
State v. Prince 250 P.3d 1145 Ariz. 2011
¶57 Juror misconduct warrants a new trial if “the defense shows actual prejudice or if prejudice may be fairly presumed from the facts.” (emphasis omitted).
State v. Garcia 226 P.3d 370 Ariz. 2010
State v. Garcia 226 P.3d 370 Ariz. 2010
When an issue of potential juror misconduct arises, “the court’s response should be ‘commensurate with the severity of the threat 14 posed.’” (quoting United States v. Thomas, 463 F.2d 1061, 1063 (7th Cir. 1972)).
State v. Dann 207 P.3d 604 Ariz. 2009
State v. Dann 207 P.3d 604 Ariz. 2009
Accordingly, “juror misconduct warrants a new trial [only] if the defense shows actual prejudice or if prejudice may be fairly presumed from the facts.” (emphasis removed).
State v. Cruz 181 P.3d 196 Ariz. 2008
State v. Cruz 181 P.3d 196 Ariz. 2008
“[J]uror misconduct warrants a new trial [only] if the defense shows actual prejudice or if prejudice may be fairly presumed from the facts.” State v. Miller, 178 Ariz. 555, 558
State v. Olquin 165 P.3d 228 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
State v. Olquin 165 P.3d 228 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
vacated on other grounds
State v. Roque 141 P.3d 368 Ariz. 2006
State v. Roque 141 P.3d 368 Ariz. 2006
¶103 “In a criminal case, any private communication, contact or tampering[,] directly or indirectly, with a juror during a trial about the matter pending before the jury is, for obvious reasons, deemed presumptively prejudicial.” State v. Miller, 178 Ariz. 555, 558-59, -92 (1994) (quoting Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 229 (1954)).
State v. Davolt 84 P.3d 456 Ariz. 2004
State v. Davolt 84 P.3d 456 Ariz. 2004
State v. Hall 65 P.3d 90 Ariz. 2003
State v. Hall 65 P.3d 90 Ariz. 2003
In applying that standard, this court observed that “[a]ny private communication, contact or tampering with a juror gives rise to a strong presumption that the verdict has been tainted.” , (citing Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 229 , 74 S.Ct.
State v. Trostle 951 P.2d 869 Ariz. 1997
State v. Trostle 951 P.2d 869 Ariz. 1997
(third-party communication related directly to ultimate issue of defendant’s guilt or innocence).
State v. Spears 908 P.2d 1062 Ariz. 1996
State v. Spears 908 P.2d 1062 Ariz. 1996
Dunn v. Maras 897 P.2d 714 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1995
Dunn v. Maras 897 P.2d 714 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1995
(quoting Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 472 , 85 S.Ct.
State v. Eastlack 883 P.2d 999 Ariz. 1994
State v. Eastlack 883 P.2d 999 Ariz. 1994