Cited by
Opinions in Arizona that cite State v. Hyde, 921 P.2d 655.
- State v. Orner Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
- State v. Orner Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
- State v. Parker Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
- State v. Parker Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
- State v. Montgomery Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
- State v. Montgomery Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
- State v. Jean 372 P.3d 1019 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
- State v. Jean 372 P.3d 1019 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
- State v. Dugan Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
- State v. Dugan Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
- State of Arizona v. Nicholas Olaf Kjolsrud, Loni Kay Kambitsch 371 P.3d 647 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2016
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State of Arizona v. Nicholas Olaf Kjolsrud, Loni Kay Kambitsch
371 P.3d 647
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2016
¶19 “[T]he sole purpose of the exclusionary rule [is] to deter Fourth Amendment violations,” in particular when “‘the police have engaged in willful, or at the very least negligent, conduct,’” quoting Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 443, 447 (1974).
- State v. Carrillo Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
- State v. Carrillo Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
- State v. Jensen Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
- State v. Jensen Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
- State v. Nissley 362 P.3d 493 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
- State v. Nash Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
- State v. Nash Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
- State v. Nissley 362 P.3d 493 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
- State v. Holmes Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
- State v. Holmes Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
- State v. MacIel 358 P.3d 621 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
- State v. MacIel 358 P.3d 621 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
- State of Arizona v. Ronald James Sisco II 359 P.3d 1 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2015
- State of Arizona v. Ronald James Sisco II 359 P.3d 1 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2015
- State of Arizona v. Michael Jonathon Carlson 351 P.3d 1079 Ariz. 2015
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State of Arizona v. Michael Jonathon Carlson
351 P.3d 1079
Ariz. 2015
(“An expert may not give an opinion as to the accuracy, reliability, or truthfulness of a [party].”); see also United States v. Ganadonegro, 805 F. Supp. 2d 1188, 1212 (D.N.M.
- State v. Krauch Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
- State v. Krauch Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
- State v. Smith Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
- State v. Smith Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
- State v. Swope Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
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State v. Swope
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
(internal citation omitted).
- State v. Chavez Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
- State v. Chavez Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
- State v. Cook Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
- State v. Cook Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
- State of Arizona v. Carlos Ubaldo Gonzalez 330 P.3d 969 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2014
- State of Arizona v. Carlos Ubaldo Gonzalez 330 P.3d 969 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2014
- State v. Curtis Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
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State v. Curtis
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
In reviewing a denial of a motion to suppress, this court limits the review to the facts the superior court considered at the suppression hearing, viewed in the light most favorable to sustaining the superior court’s ruling
- State of Arizona v. Edward James Rose 297 P.3d 906 Ariz. 2013
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State of Arizona v. Edward James Rose
297 P.3d 906
Ariz. 2013
The jury may find this aggravator only “if the expectation of pecuniary gain is a motive, cause, or impetus for the murder and not merely a result of the murder.” ¶ 11, ( ).
- State of Arizona v. Steven John Parker 296 P.3d 54 Ariz. 2013
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State of Arizona v. Steven John Parker
296 P.3d 54
Ariz. 2013
To prove this aggravator, the state must show that “the expectation of pecuniary gain is a motive, cause, or impetus for the murder and not merely a result of the murder.” State v. Hyde, 186 Ariz. 252, 280
- State v. Bouck 241 P.3d 524 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2010
- State v. Bouck 241 P.3d 524 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2010
- State v. Villalobos 235 P.3d 227 Ariz. 2010
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State v. Villalobos
235 P.3d 227
Ariz. 2010
105 (requiring that, upon request, a trial court give a limiting instruction when evidence is admissible for one purpose but not another); -77, -80 (1996) (stating that an offer to issue limiting 9 instruction “afforded the defendant adequate protection against unfair prejudice”).