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To prove the first prong, the defendant “must do more than simply speculate about how the evidence might have been helpful.” Glissendorf, 235 Ariz. at 150, ¶ 9; see, (“A Willits instruction is not given merely because a more exhaustive investigation could have been made.”).

Introducing evidence showing a defendant has been in custody at some point—such as evidence of jail calls, interview videos, or other similar material—does not implicate the same concerns because such evidence is not a “constant reminder of the accused’s condition” during the trial that “furthers no essential state policy.” Estelle, 425 U.S. at 504–05; (“Certainly the jurors were aware that defendants were arrested and 5 STATE v. BROOKS Decision of the Court had spent some time in custody prior

(“Certainly the jurors were aware that defendants were arrested and had spent some time in custody prior to trial.

“[I]n the interest of judicial economy, joint trials are the rule rather than the exception.”

(explaining the need to analyze photographs for relevance and potential to arouse prejudice, then weighing the probative value against the prejudicial effect).

Gomes’s claim that the jurors “did not represent a fair cross-section of the community” also fails because he offered no evidence that any group was excluded or underrepresented “due to systematic exclusion.”

“Hybrid representation involves concurrent or alternate representation by both defendant and counsel.”

State v. Prince (Prince I), ¶ 13 (2003); see also State v. (Robert W.) Murray, (“A clear abuse of discretion is established only when a defendant shows that, at the time he made his motion to sever, he had proved that his defense would be prejudiced absent severance.”).

Although “joint trials are the rule rather than the exception,” a court must order a 1 Before trial, Moore moved to preclude the admission of Elia’s statements under Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), which held that admitting a statement of a nontestifying codefendant that inculpates the defendant in a joint trial violates the defendant’s rights under

“Although there is some possibility of confusion in a joint trial, in the interest of judicial economy, joint trials are the rule rather than the exception.” (citation omitted).

A superior court’s denial of a motion for mistrial will only be reversed if it is “palpably improper and clearly injurious.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

And, contrary to Felix’s argument, “[t]he probative value of [this] evidence is not reduced because it is circumstantial.”

We will reverse the court’s rulings only for an abuse of discretion that is “palpably improper and clearly injurious.” (quotation and citation omitted).

(“Certainly the jurors were aware that defendants were arrested and had spent some time in custody prior to trial.

“Absent an indictment that the State knew was partially based on perjured, material testimony, [a] defendant may not challenge matters relevant only to the grand jury proceedings by appeal from conviction.”

State v. 4 –12 (1987); (“A Willits instruction is not given merely because a more exhaustive investigation could have been made.”).

“[T]here are no lesser included offenses of felony murder.”

“A Willits instruction is not given merely because a more exhaustive investigation could have been made.”