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We review for an abuse of discretion, and reverse only if the defendant can show “compelling prejudice against which the trial court was unable to protect.” ( ).

A defendant may not receive a Willits instruction “merely because a more exhaustive investigation could have been made.”

Appellate review of a ruling on a motion for change of venue based on a claim of pretrial publicity involves two inquires: “(1) did the publicity pervade the court proceedings to the extent that prejudice can be presumed?; if not, then (2) did defendant show actual prejudice among members of the jury?”

“When a defendant challenges a denial of severance on appeal, he ‘must demonstrate compelling prejudice against which the trial court was unable to protect.’”

See, (noting that “[a] Willits instruction is not given merely because a more exhaustive investigation could have been made”); (concluding that the evidence had “no evidentiary value”); 585 P.

¶13 Although much of the evidence was circumstantial, “[t]he probative value of evidence is not reduced because it is circumstantial.”

¶ 9 “A person commits armed robbery if in the course of taking property from the presence of another against his will, such *278 person is armed with a deadly weapon and threatens or uses force with the intent to coerce the surrender of property or to prevent resistance.” , see also A.R.S.

at 93–94, 97-98; (citing Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767 (1995)).

Blackman, ¶¶ 42, 48, 50, 38 P.3d at 1203, 1204, 1205; (recognizing “‘facially incriminating’” evidence from codefendant as ground for severance under Rule 13.4)

Therefore, its decision will be overturned on appeal “only if it [is] ‘palpably improper and clearly injurious.’ ” , (citation omitted).

¶60 A conviction for premeditated first degree murder must be supported by substantial evidence of premeditation, and this Court views all evidence “in the light most favorable to sustaining the conviction and [resolves] all reasonable inferences .

This analysis involves two inquiries: “(1) did the publicity pervade the court proceedings to the extent that prejudice can be presumed?; if not, then (2) did defendant show actual prejudice among members of the jury?” Cruz, , 181 P.3d at 203

See Landrigan, 176 Ariz. at 6, 859 P.2d at 116; see also Jackson, 186 Ariz. at 27, 918 7 P.2d at 1045 (second-degree murder instruction not warranted when record does not support finding of lack of premeditation); (second-degree murder instruction not warranted because, given evidence, “[t]he only inference that a jury rationally could have drawn was that defendants premeditated”); Salazar, 173 Ariz. at 408, 844 P.2d at 575 (“Because defendant‟s theory of the case denies all involvement in the

(finding motion for mistrial based on witnesses‟ testimony exposing defendant‟s custodial status properly denied when information “not prejudicial” in context of case).

The “key to this rule is ‘whether the jury could rationally fail to find the distinguishing element of the greater offense.’” ¶ 37, ( ); ¶ 23, this case, the State produced all calls taped by the detectives and disclosed a list of the phone calls they reviewed but did not preserve, and thus com

(concluding in a criminal case that an expert's failure to follow prescribed FBI methodology for preserving and analyzing footprint evidence went to the weight rather than the admissibility of the evidence); Hawkins v. Allstate Ins.

¶40 To receive a Willits instruction, the “defendant must show (1) that the state failed to preserve material and reasonably accessible evidence having a tendency to exonerate him, and (2) that this failure resulted in prejudice.”