Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite State v. McKinney, 917 P.2d 1214.

70 citing documents.

State of Arizona v. Dimitri Polanco Romero Ariz. 2026
We have likewise stated that the “general rule is that questions that put the answer into the mouth of one’s witness in chief should not be asked.” ().
State v. Puga 564 P.3d 631 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2025
State v. Puga 564 P.3d 631 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2025
A leading question suggests the desired answer: “The cat was black, wasn’t it?”
State of Arizona v. Dimitri Polanco Romero 556 P.3d 305 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2024
State of Arizona v. Dimitri Polanco Romero 556 P.3d 305 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2024
¶57 Although, as noted, a question is not leading merely because the answer is obvious, Agnew, 132 Ariz. at 577, “[w]hat is desired is that the trier hear what the witness perceived, not the acquiescence of the witness in counsel’s interpretation of what he perceived,” (alteration in McKinney) (quoting Morris K. Udall et al., Arizona Practice: Law of Evidence § 33 (3d ed. 1991)).
State of Arizona v. Robert Allen Poyson 475 P.3d 293 Ariz. 2020
State of Arizona v. Robert Allen Poyson 475 P.3d 293 Ariz. 2020
¶ 14, when pecuniary gain is the “catalyst for the entire chain of events leading to the murders.”
State of Arizona v. Charles Michael Hedlund 431 P.3d 181 Ariz. 2018
State of Arizona v. Charles Michael Hedlund 431 P.3d 181 Ariz. 2018
(reviewing factual and procedural history in a consolidated case involving Hedlund).
State of Arizona v. James Erin McKinney 426 P.3d 1204 Ariz. 2018
State of Arizona v. James Erin McKinney 426 P.3d 1204 Ariz. 2018
State v. McKinney (McKinney I)
State of Arizona v. Robert Hernandez 305 P.3d 378 Ariz. 2013
State of Arizona v. Robert Hernandez 305 P.3d 378 Ariz. 2013
¶66 Before 1993, the (F)(2) aggravator applied when a “defendant was previously convicted of a felony in the United States involving the use or threat of violence on another person.” n.4, n.4 (1996).
State v. Cruz 181 P.3d 196 Ariz. 2008
State v. Cruz 181 P.3d 196 Ariz. 2008
State v. Wassenaar 161 P.3d 608 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
State v. Wassenaar 161 P.3d 608 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
State of Arizona v. Ramon Anthony Joyner Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2007
State of Arizona v. Rachel Marie Vallejo 158 P.3d 916 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2007
State of Arizona v. Ramon Anthony Joyner Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2007
¶22 -83, -30 (1996), the court cited Walden, noting that although the defendant’s “prior conviction [for second- degree murder] was for a crime that, on the face of the statute, might have been committed recklessly” and so could not be used as an aggravating factor under former § 13-703(F)(2), t
State Ex Rel. Thomas v. Rayes 141 P.3d 806 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2006
State Ex Rel. Thomas v. Rayes 141 P.3d 806 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2006
P. 17.4(b) (“An agreement may be revoked by any party prior to its acceptance by the court.”)
State v. Newell 132 P.3d 833 Ariz. 2006
State v. Newell 132 P.3d 833 Ariz. 2006
State of Arizona v. Rodney George Jackson Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2004
State of Arizona v. Rodney George Jackson Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2004
el also mentioned that the prosecutor had been willing to discuss plea negotiations but that counsel had not responded, and that he had “lost some sleep about that.” ¶6 “‘[C]riminal defendan ts have no constitutional right to a plea agreement and the state is not required to offer one.’” 222 (1996).
State v. Secord 88 P.3d 587 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2004
State v. Secord 88 P.3d 587 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2004
¶ 6 “It is well settled that criminal defendants have no constitutional right to a plea agreement and the state is not required to offer one.”
State v. Davolt 84 P.3d 456 Ariz. 2004
State v. Davolt 84 P.3d 456 Ariz. 2004
State v. Cropper 68 P.3d 407 Ariz. 2003
State v. Cropper 68 P.3d 407 Ariz. 2003
(holding F.2 aggravating circumstance applies "to convictions entered prior to the sentencing hearing, regardless of the order in which the underlying crimes occurred or the convictions entered”); -81 , -28 (1996) (holding F.2 aggravating circumstance applied where defendant was simultaneously convicted of first and second degree murder because the convictions occurred before the first degree murder sentencing).
State v. Towery 64 P.3d 828 Ariz. 2003
State of Arizona v. Roger Wayne Murray Ariz. 2003
State of Arizona v. Roger Wayne Murray Ariz. 2003
P.2d 1287 (1999); P.2d 784 (1997); P.2d 290 (1996); P.2d 1214 (1996).
State v. Towery 64 P.3d 828 Ariz. 2003
State v. Pandeli 26 P.3d 1136 Ariz. 2001
State v. Pandeli 26 P.3d 1136 Ariz. 2001
Doerr, 193 Ariz. at 69 , 969 P.2d at 1181 ¶ 64; State v. McKinney (II)
State v. Sansing 26 P.3d 1118 Ariz. 2001
State v. Sansing 26 P.3d 1118 Ariz. 2001
State v. Hoskins 14 P.3d 997 Ariz. 2000
State v. Hoskins 14 P.3d 997 Ariz. 2000
Spears, 184 Ariz. at 295-96 , 908 P.2d at 1080-81 ; White, 168 Ariz. at 511 , 815 P.2d at 880 , abrogated on other grounds by Salazar, 173 Ariz. at 416-17 , 844 P.2d at 583-84 .
State v. Donald 10 P.3d 1193 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2000
State v. Donald 10 P.3d 1193 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2000
See United States v. Osif, 789 F.2d 1404, 1405 (9th Cir.1986)
State v. Martinez 999 P.2d 795 Ariz. 2000
State v. Martinez 999 P.2d 795 Ariz. 2000
8 ¶ 43 (2) Martinez’ argument regarding the theoretical possibility of committing reckless assault is based upon the erroneous assumption that the old (F)(2) concepts, , (finding that the (F)(2) aggravating factor does not apply to offenses which can be committed recklessly), carry over to the new (F)(2).
Katherine S. v. Foreman 4 P.3d 426 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1999
Katherine S. v. Foreman 4 P.3d 426 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1999
our supreme court explained that a proceeding is in a critical stage when substantial rights may be affected by what is transpiring.
State v. Van Adams 984 P.2d 16 Ariz. 1999
State v. Van Adams 984 P.2d 16 Ariz. 1999
(when conducting an independent review of the evidence, consideration is given to the “quality and the strength” of the aggravating and mitigating factors).