Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite State v. Lautzenheiser, 881 P.2d 339.

26 citing documents.

  • State v. Schalk Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2025
  • State v. Schalk Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2025
    ing of coercion include a judge having ex parte communications with a deliberating juror, -74 (1996), a judge providing an impasse instruction prematurely, see Huerstel, 206 Ariz. at 101, ¶ 25, or a judge persuading a jury foreman to keep deliberating after the foreman expressed that further deliberations would be unproductive
  • State v. Brown 556 P.3d 776 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2024
  • State v. Brown 556 P.3d 776 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2024
    waives the right to raise the issue on appeal.’” (quoting Gendron, 168 Ariz. at 154); (same); (same); (similar); (“Defendant did not object to the instruction at trial.
  • State v. Dzieglo Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2021
  • State v. Dzieglo Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2021
    ¶20 to show the circumstances required a continuance.
  • State v. Beatte Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
  • State v. Beatte Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
    “[W]henever a judge improperly influences or coerces a verdict, the defendant is denied ‘a right essential to his case.’”
  • State v. Silva Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
  • State v. Silva Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
    -73 (1996); -10 (1994); State v. McCutcheon (McCutcheon II), State v. McCutcheon (McCutcheon I), Roberts, 131 Ariz. at 514-16
  • State v. Rodriguez-Rosario 193 P.3d 807 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2008
  • State v. Rodriguez-Rosario 193 P.3d 807 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2008
  • State v. Cruz 181 P.3d 196 Ariz. 2008
  • State v. Cruz 181 P.3d 196 Ariz. 2008
    State - 36 - v. Lautzenheiser, -10, -42 (1994) (suggesting that a single holdout juror may need to be “checked for bruises”); -18, -63 (1982) (Feldman, J., dissenting).
  • State v. Fernandez 169 P.3d 641 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
  • State v. Fernandez 169 P.3d 641 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
    “What conduct amounts to coercion is particularly dependent upon the facts of each ease.” , (finding judge’s inquiry into the numerical division of the impasse and comment on the large amount of evidence did not result in coercion); -10 , -42 (1994) (finding verdict was coerced when a judge ordered continued deliberation after a “hold out” juror was twice singled out in open court “as the person responsible for delaying the conclusion of the proceedings”); -20 , -69 (1986)
  • State v. Huerstel 75 P.3d 698 Ariz. 2003
  • State v. Huerstel 75 P.3d 698 Ariz. 2003
    Additionally, the court 13 concluded that singling out a juror, even in the polling process, could potentially cause harm by making it likely the individual juror will be subject to pressure by his fellow jurors.
  • State v. Sabala 943 P.2d 776 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1997
  • State v. Sabala 943 P.2d 776 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1997
    Sabala argues that this circumstance led to a coerced verdict, , (“Lautzenheiser II ”), and McCutcheon, 150 Ariz. at 320 , 723 P.2d at 669 .
  • State v. McCrimmon 927 P.2d 1298 Ariz. 1996
  • State v. McCrimmon 927 P.2d 1298 Ariz. 1996
    In any event, , we held that it is fundamental error “whenever a judge improperly influences or coerces a verdict.” Id.
  • State v. Dunlap 930 P.2d 518 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1996
  • State v. Dunlap 930 P.2d 518 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1996
    The totality of circumstances must be considered in determining whether the defendant “received a fair trial at the hands of an independent jury, the members of which were free from intimidation or undue pressure.”
  • State v. McAnulty 909 P.2d 466 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1995
  • State v. McAnulty 909 P.2d 466 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1995
    s that the trial judge “coerced” a guilty verdict on Count III because he “gave the jury no more than ten to fifteen minutes to come up with a verdict or a mistrial would be declared.” Although defense counsel did not object to the judge’s instructions, that fact is immaterial since fundamental error is present “whenever a judge improperly influences or coerces a verdict.”