Cited by

(due process violation based on preindictment delay requires “proof of an intentional delay for strategic or harassment purposes”).

(quoting Tison, 481 U.S. at 157).

See State v. 5 Broughton, 156 Ariz. at 397.

(“Even if the statute of limitations has expired on the predicate offense, a defendant may still be prosecuted for felony murder.”).

349, 1297 (1996) (finding sufficient evidence of predicate crime of burglary to support felony-murder convictions, although burglary charge previously was dismissed).

that a verdict might have been different had the error not been committed.’” (citations omitted)); -49, -97 (1996) 3

(holding a motion to dismiss for pre- indictment delay must fail “[a]bsent proof of an intentional delay for strategic or harassment purposes”) (citing Stoner v. Graddick, 751 F.2d 1535, 1541 (11th Cir. 1985)).

(“A death is ‘in furtherance’ when it results from any action taken to facilitate the accomplishment of the predicate felony.”); ¶¶ 21–23 (App. 2003) (“immediate flight” lasted several minutes after robbery while defendant ran into nearby apartment complex).

See 13 (holding that a lack of certainty regarding the source of admitted evidence goes to the weight of the evidence, not to its admissibility).

See, (“Lack of positive identification goes to the weight of evidence, not to its admissibility.”); (noting that evidence that was “not a conclusive link in the case goes only to the weight and not the admissibility”).

See State v. Van Adams, 194 6 STATE v. CRANDALL Decision of the Court Ariz. 408, 416, ¶ 23, (noting that admission of testimony that was irrelevant and emotional was harmless error); -49, -97 (1996).

accord United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 789, 790 (1977); United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 324-25 (1971).

“A death is in furtherance when it results from any action taken to facilitate the accomplishment of the predicate felony.” State v. Lacy, 187 Ariz. 340, 349-50, -98 (1996) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted); see also State v. Arias, 131 Ariz. 441, 443, (distinguishing death that facilitates cr

(finding substantial participation in predicate burglary when defendant stole property).

This factor may, however, be relevant in determining if a defendant acted with “reckless indifference.” (finding that failure to render aid or call for help does not alone establish reckless indifference).

¶37 P.2d 1288 (1996), in support of his contention that the record contains insufficient evidence that he acted with reckless indifference to life.

(finding that the evidence did not demonstrate violence beyond that necessary to kill when the record did not establish the time between the four gunshot wounds or the order in which the shots were fired); (finding the record did not support a finding of gratuitous violence when the “medical testimony did not establish which of the three shots was fatal”).

(error in admission of hearsay evidence requires reversal only if “reasonable probability” exists that “the verdict would have been different had the evidence not been admitted”).

“The jury must simply find that the defendant committed or attempted to commit it.”

(citing Jerousek, 121 Ariz. at 424, 590 P.2d at 1370).

§ 13-703(F)(8) for multiple homicides committed over a nine-hour period “during the commission of the offense”); P.2d 1288 (1996) (multiple homicide victims under § 13-703(F)(8)).