Cited by

“The determination of a Rule 10.1 motion lies within the discretion of the trial judge, and we will not interfere absent an affirmative showing of abuse.”

(bias claims based on “comments allegedly showing the [superior] court’s irritation with defendant, should have been raised at that time and are therefore now waived”).

(“[T]he customary way to prove a prior offense is by introducing appropriate documentary evidence in the trial court.”).

(reviewing denial of motion to recuse in criminal case for abuse of discretion).

¶53 We review denials of continuances for “clear abuse of discretion,” The rule now requires capital cases to be tried within twenty-four months of arraignment.

¶26 In addition, we have been “unwilling to say that all stranglings are per se cruel.” State v. Schackart, 190 Ariz. 238, 248

See State v. Schackart, 190 Ariz. 238, 249, (finding evidence did not support gratuitous violence when the medical examiner concluded that the majority of the injuries were associated with the means of killing); cf. Jones, 205 Ariz. at 450 ¶ 17, 72 P.3d at 1269 (finding gratuitous violence when the victim suffered nine blows

(“Because our court does not act as a fact-finder, we generally do not consider materials that are outside the record on appeal.”); , 197 P. 578, 579 (1921) ("We cannot consider any evidence outside of that contained in the record on appeal."); Benitez

17 granting relief,9 see Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 579, 106 S. Ct. 3101, 3106 (1986), and the Sixth Amendment right “to be present at all critical stages of the proceedings.”

Id.; (implying trial court might have relied on jury instructions used in obtaining prior conviction to determine violence factor under former § 13-703(F)(2); supreme court would not consider evidence because presented for first time on appeal).9 ¶23 Federal courts have faced si

and do so again here, particularly because much of the delay resulted from Smith’s pursuit of his rights to post-conviction relief, as opposed to intentional delay by the State in carrying out the death sentence.

However, “judicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion,” Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555, without showing “[]either an extrajudicial source of bias []or any deep-seated favoritism,”

E.g., McKenzie v. Day, 57 F.3d 1461, 1466-67 (9th Cir.1995) (finding that delay in carrying out executions benefits inmates, allowing them to extend their lives and perhaps obtain commutations, reversals, or exoneration); , (rejecting defendant’s claim that prolonged incarceration before execution constitutes cruel and unusual punishment).

(“Senselessness and helplessness, without more, are ordinarily insufficient to prove heinousness or depravity.”).

Arizona’s death penalty statute is unconstitutional on its face and as applied, rejected in id.; , but see supra ¶¶ 40-44.

(alcohol may have caused some impairment, but not enough to meet the (G)(1) mitigator); Rienhardt, 190 Ariz. at 591-92 , 951 P.2d at 466-67 (no evidence offered that could establish the level of intoxication); , (mental health expert offered inconclusive evidence related to mental illness); -50 , -81 (1997) (long-time substance abuse problems insufficient to establish the (G)(1) mitigator)

(holding that the fact that defendant spent years on death row awaiting execution does not render the death penalty cruel and unusual punishment).

§ 13-703.F.2, which previously required that the prior felony’s statutory definition "involve[] violence or the threat of violence.” , cert.