Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite State v. Dickens, 926 P.2d 468.

135 citing documents.

Calderon-Palomino v. Nichols 36 P.3d 767 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2001
-10 , -77 (1996) (court’s requirement that indigent defendant spend funds granted for investigation and experts in reasonable way did not violate federal or state Equal Protection Clauses).
State v. Pandeli 26 P.3d 1136 Ariz. 2001
State v. Tschilar 27 P.3d 331 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2001
State v. Tschilar 27 P.3d 331 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2001
State v. Pandeli 26 P.3d 1136 Ariz. 2001
State v. Nordstrom 25 P.3d 717 Ariz. 2001
State v. Nordstrom 25 P.3d 717 Ariz. 2001
18 n. 7, , 485 n. 7 (1996).
State v. Miranda 22 P.3d 506 Ariz. 2001
State v. Miranda 22 P.3d 506 Ariz. 2001
State v. Miranda 10 P.3d 1213 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2000
State v. Miranda 10 P.3d 1213 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2000
State v. Marshall 4 P.3d 1039 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2000
State v. Marshall 4 P.3d 1039 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2000
18 n. 7, , 485 n. 7 (1996) (intrinsic evidence includes that which is inextricably intertwined with charged crime or part of same criminal episode so as to be admissible absent a Rule 404(b) analysis).
State v. Kayer 984 P.2d 31 Ariz. 1999
State v. Kayer 984 P.2d 31 Ariz. 1999
(age differences and existence of plea agreement justified sentencing disparity); Stokley, 182 Ariz. at 523-24 , 898 P.2d at 472-73 (existence of valid plea agreement explained sentencing disparity); -69 , -40 (1997) (appropriate plea
State v. Van Adams 984 P.2d 16 Ariz. 1999
State v. Van Adams 984 P.2d 16 Ariz. 1999
State v. White 982 P.2d 819 Ariz. 1999
State v. White 982 P.2d 819 Ariz. 1999
Milke, , (3) that the statute need not require the sentencing court to specify which mitigators were proved and which were not, State v. (Rudi) Apelt, , (4) that the statutory requirement that mitigators be proved by a preponderance does not preclude consideration of all mitigating factors, -27 , -94 (1996); (5) that A.R.S.
State v. Wagner 976 P.2d 250 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1999
State v. Wagner 976 P.2d 250 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1999
(stating that a defendant’s “tactical decision not to contest an essential element of the offense” does not relieve the state’s burden of proving each element of the alleged crime), cert.
State v. Vigil 986 P.2d 222 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1999
State v. Vigil 986 P.2d 222 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1999
Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 183-84 , 117 S.Ct.
State v. Sharp 973 P.2d 1171 Ariz. 1999
State v. Sharp 973 P.2d 1171 Ariz. 1999
State v. Hughes 969 P.2d 1184 Ariz. 1998
State v. Hughes 969 P.2d 1184 Ariz. 1998
Our general rule has been stated several times over the years, , as follows: “[T]his court does not recognize the so-called cumulative error doctrine.” , State v. *79 White
State v. Henry 944 P.2d 57 Ariz. 1997
State v. Henry 944 P.2d 57 Ariz. 1997
State v. Riggs 942 P.2d 1159 Ariz. 1997
State v. Riggs 942 P.2d 1159 Ariz. 1997
A defendant’s fundamental right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses is “limited to the presentation of matters admissible under ordinary evidentiary rules, including relevance.” , ( , ); Ariz. R. Evid.
Leavy v. Parsell 932 P.2d 1340 Ariz. 1997
Leavy v. Parsell 932 P.2d 1340 Ariz. 1997
at 5-6; Rich, 184 Ariz. at 181 , 907 P.2d at 1384 ; , (jurors cannot be interrogated to inquire into their mental processes).
State v. Thornton 929 P.2d 676 Ariz. 1996
State v. Thornton 929 P.2d 676 Ariz. 1996
(stating that jurors may use personal knowledge of the geographic area involved in a case to draw inferences from facts already in evidence).