Cited by

If reasonable persons can “fairly differ as to whether certain evidence establishes a fact in issue, then such evidence must be considered as substantial.” ¶ 87 (2004) ().

(explaining that absent abuse of discretion, reviewing courts will not “‘second-guess a trial court’s ruling on the admissibility or relevance of evidence.’”) ().

DISCUSSION ¶7 “Absent a clear abuse of discretion, we will not second-guess a trial court’s ruling on the admissibility or relevance of evidence.”

“Absent a clear abuse of discretion, we will not second-guess a trial court’s ruling on the admissibility or relevance of evidence.”

“Absent a clear abuse of discretion, we will not second-guess a trial court’s ruling on the admissibility or relevance of evidence.”

State v. Davolt , , ¶ 87, (alteration in Rodriguez ) (quoting State v. Rodriguez , , 245, , 648 (1996) ).

“Absent a clear abuse of discretion, we will not second-guess a trial court’s ruling on the admissibility or relevance of evidence.”

¶22 “Absent a clear abuse of discretion, we will not second-guess a trial court’s ruling on the admissibility or relevance of evidence.”

“Absent a clear abuse of discretion, we will not second-guess a trial court’s ruling on the admissibility or relevance of evidence.”

“Absent a clear abuse of discretion, we will not second-guess a trial court’s ruling on the admissibility or relevance of evidence.”

(“Absent a clear abuse of discretion, we will not second-guess a trial court’s ruling on the admissibility or relevance of evidence.”) (internal citations omitted).

“Absent a clear abuse of discretion, we will not second-guess a trial court’s ruling on the admissibility or relevance of evidence.”

We need not address this issue, however, because the subsequent probation search was valid, and the evidence obtained therein was properly admitted against Smith.2 ¶12 “We will not disturb a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress absent clear and manifest error.” (internal citation omitted).

in which we said that “[a] defendant should not have a lesser included instruction forced upon him,” in 3 which we said that “[i]f [the defendant] objects, the instruction should not be given.” ¶8 Krone and Rodriguez, however, were capital cases.

The state has not argued any error in this respect was harmless, , (state's failure to argue harmless error concedes point), nor would we necessarily find it so given the state's burden to prove the requisite mental state.

Our supreme court has held that “all references to polygraph tests, absent stipulation, are inadmissible for any purpose in Arizona.”

Ultimately, “[i]f reasonable [persons] may fairly differ as to whether certain evidence establishes a fact in issue, then such evidence must be considered as substantial.” , (citations omitted).

simply reviews the remainder of the evidence against the defendant to determine whether the admission of the confession was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.’” quoting Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310, 111 S. Ct. 1246, 1265 (1991); ¶¶ 17-18

7 “[AJbsent a clear abuse of discretion” by the trial court, we will not “second-guess a trial court’s ruling on the admissibility or relevance of evidence.” , ( , ) (internal quotation marks omitted).

“If reasonable [persons] may fairly differ as to whether certain evidence establishes a fact in issue, then such evidence must be considered as substantial.”