Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite State v. Portillo, 898 P.2d 970.

131 citing documents.

  • State of Arizona v. Shawn De Nean Edmisten Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2009
  • State v. Martinez 189 P.3d 348 Ariz. 2008
  • State v. Martinez 189 P.3d 348 Ariz. 2008
    P.2d 970 (1995), dilutes and shifts the burden of proof in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
  • State v. Cheramie 171 P.3d 1253 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2007
  • State v. Cheramie 171 P.3d 1253 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2007
    ¶ 20 , our supreme court adopted a uniform reasonable doubt instruction to be used in criminal trials.
  • State v. Garza 163 P.3d 1006 Ariz. 2007
  • State v. Garza 163 P.3d 1006 Ariz. 2007
    The instruction, however, -96, -74 (1995).
  • State v. Ellison 140 P.3d 899 Ariz. 2006
  • Criticized State v. Ellison 140 P.3d 899 Ariz. 2006
    1999), argues that the reasonable doubt instruction’s use of the phrase “firmly convinced” improperly reduced the State’s burden of proof to “clear and convincing.” The reasonable doubt instruction, however, comports with State v. Portillo, 182 Ariz. 592, 594-96, -74 (1995).
  • State of Arizona v. Kenneth Scott MacHado Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2006
  • State of Arizona v. Kenneth Scott MacHado Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2006
    PORTILLO INSTRUCTION ¶22 P.2d 970 (1995).
  • State v. Glassel 116 P.3d 1193 Ariz. 2005
  • State v. Glassel 116 P.3d 1193 Ariz. 2005
    - 29 - VII ¶58 P.2d 970 (1995).8 Glassel contends that Portillo should be overruled.
  • State v. Febles 115 P.3d 629 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2005
  • State v. Febles 115 P.3d 629 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2005
    (setting forth required reasonable doubt instruction).
  • State v. Roseberry 111 P.3d 402 Ariz. 2005
  • State v. Roseberry 111 P.3d 402 Ariz. 2005
    The instruction at issue is identical to the one set forth in State v. Portillo, 182 Ariz. 592, 596, which we have upheld as constitutional several times.
  • State v. Anderson 111 P.3d 369 Ariz. 2005
  • State v. Anderson 111 P.3d 369 Ariz. 2005
    In any event, , and approved repeatedly by this Court.
  • State v. Pena 104 P.3d 873 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2005
  • State v. Pena 104 P.3d 873 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2005
    (citations omitted); , (citation omitted) (stating that jury is presumed to follow its instructions).
  • State v. Wilson 82 P.3d 797 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2004
  • State v. Wilson 82 P.3d 797 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2004
    ismissal order, however, the trial court changed that ruling, acknowledging that it had failed to follow the reasoning of Wilson I and rejecting Wilson’s double jeopardy argument because she “was not acquitted.” The trial court also affirmed its prior ruling granting a new trial based on Judge Banales’s failure to give a
  • State v. Prasertphong 75 P.3d 675 Ariz. 2003
  • State v. Prasertphong 75 P.3d 675 Ariz. 2003
    E. ¶ 85 Prasertphong argues that the court’s , was erroneous and resulted in fundamental and reversible error.
  • State v. Dann 74 P.3d 231 Ariz. 2003
  • State v. Dann 74 P.3d 231 Ariz. 2003
    ¶74 , is unconstitutional because it lowers the state’s burden of proof to a clear and convincing standard, shifts the burden of proof to the defendant, and misinforms the jury that the state need not overcome every doubt.
  • State v. Lámar 72 P.3d 831 Ariz. 2003
  • State v. Lámar 72 P.3d 831 Ariz. 2003
    A. ¶ 48 Lamar contends the trial court's instruction explaining the State's burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, , is constitutionally deficient.
  • State v. Sullivan 69 P.3d 1006 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2003
  • State v. Sullivan 69 P.3d 1006 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2003
    ¶ 1 We determine in this case that the failure to give a , is error but that it is not structural error and remains subject to a harmless error analysis.
  • State v. Sucharew 66 P.3d 59 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2003
  • State v. Sucharew 66 P.3d 59 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2003
    In this sense, it is not unlike an instruction on the “defense” of “mere presence.” , (holding “mere presence” instruction required in money laundering trial), affd in part, vacated in part
  • State v. Hall 65 P.3d 90 Ariz. 2003
  • State v. Hall 65 P.3d 90 Ariz. 2003
    Did, the court’s reasonable doubt instruction, , deprive Defendant of his right to due process of law by lowering the State’s burden of proof?
  • State v. Prince 61 P.3d 450 Ariz. 2003
  • State v. Prince 61 P.3d 450 Ariz. 2003
    E. Portillo Reasonable Doubt Instruction ¶25
  • State v. Booker 53 P.3d 635 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2002
  • State v. Booker 53 P.3d 635 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2002
  • State v. Finch 46 P.3d 421 Ariz. 2002
  • State v. Finch 46 P.3d 421 Ariz. 2002
    P.2d 970 (1995), and upheld 8 ¶ 30, ¶ 30 (1999).
  • State v. Cañez 42 P.3d 564 Ariz. 2002
  • State v. Canez 42 P.3d 564 Ariz. 2002
  • State v. Cañez 42 P.3d 564 Ariz. 2002
    ¶ 76 The trial court gave the definition of reasonable doubt mandated by this court: “Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that leaves you firmly convinced of the defendant’s guilt.”
  • State v. Canez 42 P.3d 564 Ariz. 2002
    ¶76 The trial court gave the definition of reasonable doubt mandated by this court: “Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that leaves you firmly convinced of the defendant's guilt.”
  • State v. Nordstrom 25 P.3d 717 Ariz. 2001
  • State v. Nordstrom 25 P.3d 717 Ariz. 2001
    418 ¶30, , 26 ¶30 (1999)
  • State v. Foster 13 P.3d 781 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2000
  • State v. Foster 13 P.3d 781 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2000
    -18, ¶¶ 29-30 , -26 (1999), cert.
  • State v. Cotton 5 P.3d 918 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2000