Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite State v. Trostle, 951 P.2d 869.

245 citing documents.

State v. Moody 94 P.3d 1119 Ariz. 2004
Further, “[c]omments that are invited and prompted by opposing counsel’s arguments are not improper if they are reasonable and pertinent to the issues raised.”
In Re Peasley 90 P.3d 764 Ariz. 2004
In Re Peasley 90 P.3d 764 Ariz. 2004
eported decisions discuss Peasley’s misconduct in the prosecution of those cases.15 ¶52 ¶¶ 31-33, (Peasley violated the discovery rules, failing to ensure that the defendant received a fair trial), (Peasley made inflammatory remarks about the defendant and made an impermissible comment on the defendant’s failure to testify).16 We acknowledge that these cases did not lead to Peasley being formally disciplined nor did Peasley’s misconduct cause the convictions in those ca
State of Arizona v. Christina Marie George Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2003
State of Arizona v. Christina Marie George Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2003
State v. Montano 77 P.3d 1246 Ariz. 2003
State v. Montano 77 P.3d 1246 Ariz. 2003
C. ¶15 The State establishes the especially cruel aggravating circumstance if it proves, beyond a reasonable doubt, that “the victim consciously experienced physical or mental pain prior to death, and the defendant knew or should have known that suffering would occur.” (citations omitted).
State v. Prasertphong 75 P.3d 675 Ariz. 2003
State v. Prasertphong 75 P.3d 675 Ariz. 2003
State v. Canez 74 P.3d 932 Ariz. 2003
State v. Cañez 74 P.3d 932 Ariz. 2003
State v. Cañez 74 P.3d 932 Ariz. 2003
¶ 14 The cruelty factor is established by proof that the manner of death caused the victim to suffer mental and physical anguish, see Gretzler, 135 Ariz. at 51 , 659 P.2d at 10 , “and the defendant knew or should have known that suffering would occur.” , (citations omitted).
State v. Canez 74 P.3d 932 Ariz. 2003
¶14 The cruelty factor is established by proof that the manner of death caused the victim to suffer mental and physical anguish, see Gretzler, 135 Ariz. at 51, 659 P.2d at 10, “and the defendant knew or should have known that suffering would occur.” (citations omitted).
State v. Carlson 48 P.3d 1180 Ariz. 2002
State v. Carlson 48 P.3d 1180 Ariz. 2002
In State v. Trostle, we said that “[c]ruelty exists if the victim consciously experienced physical or mental pain prior to death, and Defendant knew or should have known that suffering would occur.” , (citing State v. (Rudi) Apelt, , , ).
State v. Cañez 42 P.3d 564 Ariz. 2002
State v. Canez 42 P.3d 564 Ariz. 2002
State v. Cañez 42 P.3d 564 Ariz. 2002
(declining to reexamine the continued validity of Cruz in light of Purkett); , (assuming, without deciding, that Cruz was not diluted by Purkett).
State v. Canez 42 P.3d 564 Ariz. 2002
(declining to reexamine the continued validity 11 of Cruz in light of Purkett); (assuming, without deciding, that Cruz was not diluted by Purkett).
State v. Blackman 38 P.3d 1192 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2002
State v. Blackman 38 P.3d 1192 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2002
¶ 23 Although a juror’s promise to render a verdict based on the law and evidence need not be stated in absolute terms, , in this case, the juror’s statements that he would try to follow the law are intertwined with comments that cast doubt on the wavering assurances he did give.
State v. Flores 33 P.3d 1177 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2001
State v. Flores 33 P.3d 1177 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2001
Because the determination of voluntariness is “highly fact-intensive, a court’s finding mil not be disturbed absent clear and manifest error.”
State v. Ibanez 31 P.3d 830 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2001
State v. Ibanez 31 P.3d 830 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2001
at 458-59, ¶27 , 999 P.2d at 802-03 (juror stated “I think I can be fair”); , (juror responded “I guess” when asked if he could keep an open mind despite pretrial publicity; another juror said he did not “believe” the publicity would affect his ability to do the same); -93 , -26 (1973) (juror “would try” to follo
State Ex Rel. Pennartz v. Olcavage 30 P.3d 649 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2001
State Ex Rel. Pennartz v. Olcavage 30 P.3d 649 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2001
(precluding issues presented on appeal without argument) (citation omitted); , (“Failure to argue a claim in a brief constitutes abandonment and waiver of the claim.”) (citation omitted).
State v. Pandeli 26 P.3d 1136 Ariz. 2001
State v. Tschilar 27 P.3d 331 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2001
State v. Tschilar 27 P.3d 331 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2001
State v. Pandeli 26 P.3d 1136 Ariz. 2001
2954 , 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978), this court acknowledged that “even if a disorder does not rise to the level of mental disease or defect originally contemplated in (G)(1), the inquiry is not over.”
State v. Sansing 26 P.3d 1118 Ariz. 2001
State v. Sansing 26 P.3d 1118 Ariz. 2001
State v. Ring 25 P.3d 1139 Ariz. 2001
State v. Ring 25 P.3d 1139 Ariz. 2001
State v. Lucas 18 P.3d 160 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2001
State v. Lucas 18 P.3d 160 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2001
Eagle, 196 Ariz. at 30, ¶ 11, 992 P.2d at 1125 ; , , (refusing to examine “the continued validity of [ , and its requirement that explanations be objectively verifiable] in light of ...
State v. Hoskins 14 P.3d 997 Ariz. 2000
State v. Hoskins 14 P.3d 997 Ariz. 2000
State v. Martinez 999 P.2d 795 Ariz. 2000
State v. Martinez 999 P.2d 795 Ariz. 2000
To support this argument
State v. Hughes 969 P.2d 1184 Ariz. 1998
State v. Hughes 969 P.2d 1184 Ariz. 1998
¶66 The prosecutor’s argument that Dr. Potts was Defendant’s
State v. Eagle 992 P.2d 1122 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1998
State v. Eagle 992 P.2d 1122 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1998
(refusing to examine the “continued validity” of Cruz in light of Purk-ett).