Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite State v. Lara, 902 P.2d 1337.

38 citing documents.

State v. Diaz Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2025
State v. Diaz Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2025
In this context, and as Diaz asserted at trial, his defense was based on involuntary acts, which are "'knee-jerk reflex[es] driven by the autonomic nervous system'" like "'bodily movement[s] while unconscious, asleep, under hypnosis, or during an epileptic fit.'" ¶ 199 (2004) ().
Carlos Cruz v. Hon. blair/state of Arizona 532 P.3d 327 Ariz. 2023
Carlos Cruz v. Hon. blair/state of Arizona 532 P.3d 327 Ariz. 2023
§ 13-201: “The minimum requirement for criminal liability is the performance by a person of conduct which includes a voluntary act or the omission to perform a duty imposed by law which the person is physically capable of performing.” 3 (“A.R.S.
State v. Korab Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2021
State v. Korab Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2021
State v. Timlick Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
State v. Timlick Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
(disorderly conduct not implicated when there is no question as to a distinguishing element of aggravated assault).
State of Arizona v. Dauntorian Lydel Sanders 425 P.3d 1056 Ariz. 2018
State of Arizona v. Dauntorian Lydel Sanders 425 P.3d 1056 Ariz. 2018
State v. Dodd Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
State v. Dodd Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
(given defendant’s “relentless and deadly” attack on the officer, “it is not possible that the jury could have found that [the officer] was only disturbed,” and thus, no evidence supported a disorderly conduct instruction).
State v. Multari Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
State v. Multari Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
(given defendant’s “relentless and deadly” attack on the officer, “it is not possible the jury could have found that [the officer] was only disturbed,” and thus, evidence did not support disorderly conduct instruction).
State v. George 313 P.3d 543 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2013
State of Arizona v. Heulon Colston Brown 310 P.3d 29 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2013
State of Arizona v. Heulon Colston Brown 310 P.3d 29 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2013
Section 13-105(42), A.R.S., defines “voluntary act” as “a bodily movement performed consciously and as a result of effort and determination.” Our supreme court has clarified that this definition encompasses actions that are not part of the “autonomic nervous system” or taken while “unconscious, asleep, under hypnosis, or during an epileptic fit.”
State of Arizona v. Jesus Xavier Almaguer 303 P.3d 84 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2013
State of Arizona v. Jesus Xavier Almaguer 303 P.3d 84 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2013
Involuntary acts include “the sorts of bodily movements that would not be ‘performed consciously and as a result of effort and determination.’” (involuntary acts include heartbeat, breathing, and blinking, and “bodily movement while unconscious, asleep, under hypnosis, or during an epileptic fit”), quoting former § 13-105(34) (1994) (defining “voluntary act”).7 An instruction that the state must prove the defendant committ
State v. Alvarado 200 P.3d 1037 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2008
State v. Alvarado 200 P.3d 1037 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2008
¶ 15 -35 , -39 (1995), our supreme court explained that the requirement that an act be “voluntary” is simply a codification of the common law requirement of actus reus, a requirement grounded in the principle that a person cannot be prosecuted for his thoughts alone, and that the voluntary act requir
State v. Moody 94 P.3d 1119 Ariz. 2004
State v. Moody 94 P.3d 1119 Ariz. 2004
¶ 199 , this court clarified that the “voluntary act” requirement of A.R.S.
State v. Johnson 72 P.3d 343 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2003
State v. Johnson 72 P.3d 343 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2003
("The law in Arizona is that a specific intent to do an act may be inferred from the circumstances of the doing of the act itself.’’) , 235 n. 4, , 1339 n. 4 (1995) (distinguishing the permissible inference of intent from the unconstitutional presumption of intent addressed in Sandstrom v. Montana ).
State of Arizona v. Carl W. Morgan, Jr 61 P.3d 460 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2002
State v. Morgan 61 P.3d 460 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2002
State v. Morgan 61 P.3d 460 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2002
State of Arizona v. Carl W. Morgan, Jr 61 P.3d 460 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2002
State v. Miranda 10 P.3d 1213 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2000
State v. Miranda 10 P.3d 1213 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2000
("assuming, without deciding, the continuing validity of [Angle ],....
State v. Marshall 4 P.3d 1039 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2000
State v. Marshall 4 P.3d 1039 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2000
(affirming trial court’s refusal of instruction for disorderly conduct on theory that victim was merely disturbed, given undisputed evidence that he was in apprehension of imminent bodily injury).
State v. Valenzuela 984 P.2d 12 Ariz. 1999
State v. Valenzuela 984 P.2d 12 Ariz. 1999
lesser offense[ ] ha[ve] been.”
State v. Cutright 2 P.3d 657 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1999
In Re Charles B. 978 P.2d 659 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1998
In Re Charles B. 978 P.2d 659 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1998
-81 , -27 (App.1994), vacated in part