Cited by

¶21 The State’s is misplaced.

Although the court did not expressly state whether the offer was more favorable, the court is presumed to know and correctly apply the law, and to consider all the evidence properly before it, ¶ 18 (App. 2004).

(“Trial judges ‘are presumed to know the law and to apply it in making their decisions.’”) (citation omitted).

Moreover, “judges are presumed to know the law and to apply it in making their decisions.”

Moreover, Soto’s testimony was not inflammatory, (noting testimony did not use inflammatory language when weighing testimony’s prejudicial value), and did not tend to encourage judgment on emotion, sympathy, horror, or any other improper basis.

“When reasonable minds may differ on inferences from the facts, the case must be submitted to the jury, and the trial judge has no discretion to enter a judgment of acquittal.” [].

The superior court is “presumed to know the law and apply it in making [its] decisions.”

“[J]udges ‘are presumed to know the law and to apply it in making their decision.’” (citation omitted).

at 408–09, ¶ 23; (“The legislature may establish a sentencing scheme in which an element of a crime could also be used for enhancement and aggravation purposes.”).

(noting that, because the trial court is in the best position to determine the effect of a prosecutor’s comments on the jury, we will not disturb the trial court’s ruling absent an abuse of discretion).

(“The legislature may establish a sentencing scheme in which an element of a crime could also be used for enhancement and aggravation purposes.”).

¶ 12 (App. 2002) (citation omitted); (“[J]udges ‘are presumed to know the law and to apply it in making their decisions.’”) (citation omitted).

(appellate courts do not reweigh the evidence on appeal).

(citation omitted) (“Trial judges ‘are presumed to know the law and to 5 GRAVES v. SLAWSON Decision of the Court apply it in making their decisions.’”).

See West, 226 Ariz. at 562, ¶ 16 (“[T]he relevant question [when considering a Rule 20 motion] is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”); (explaining that where evidence points to differing results, it is for the jury to decide and the trial court may not grant a judgment of acquittal).

We review the evidence “in the light most favorable to sustaining the conviction.”

Still, we “view the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the conviction, and, because the jury has returned its verdict and presumptively followed instructions, all reasonable inferences will be resolved against a defendant.”

(“The legislature may establish a sentencing scheme in which an element of a crime could also be used for enhancement and aggravation purposes.”).

The superior court is “presumed to know the law and apply it in making [its] decisions,” (quoting Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 653 (1990), overruled on other grounds by Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002)), including its obligation to consider “all of the circumstances that bear upon the issue of racial animosity,” Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737, 1748 (2016) (quoting Snyder, 552

¶ 19 (App. 2011) (“Having decided to admit the testimony pursuant to Rule 404(b), the superior court necessarily concluded the testimony constituted clear and convincing evidence of the act.” (citation omitted)); (presuming trial judges know the law and apply it in making their decisions (citations omitted)).