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The court also considered that evidence needed for Moore’s defense stemmed from Betsy herself, who “denied a pre-trial interview which she had the right to do.” See Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 2.1(A)(5); (the Victims’ Bill of Rights provides victims with various constitutional rights, including the right to refuse an interview by defendant’s attorney).

which contravenes its provisions must fall.’” W. Devcor, –31 (1991) (); (stating that “the implementing statutes and [court] rules cannot eliminate or narrow rights guaranteed by the state constitution”); (finding legislative amendment to A.R.S.

Fund v. Superior Court (EnerGCorp, Inc.), -76 , -04 (App. 1997) ( , , ).

Fund v. Superior Court (EnerGCorp, Inc.), -76, -04 (App. 1997) ( ).

(“The choice of the appropriate wording rests with the Legislature, and the court may not substitute its judgment for that of the Legislature.”) (citation omitted); (“A well established rule of statutory construction provides that the 4 STATE v. ABDI Opinion of the Court expression of one or more items of a class indicates an intent to exclude all items of the same cl

P.2d 1288 (1976); (distinguishing McBrayer and adopting the Turley analysis when a legislative act infringes on a voter-enacted constitutional provision).

¶ 7 The State based its refusal to disclose the victims’ birth dates on the Victims’ Bill of Rights, an amendment to the Arizona Constitution adopted “[t]o preserve and protect victims’ rights to justice and due process.” Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 2.1(A); , (discussing the history of the Victims’ Bill of Rights and related statutes and court rules).

(determining legislature improperly reduced the scope of victims’ rights provided in the constitution by denying victim status to a category of people that were not denied status by the constitution).

Fund v. Superior Court (EnerGCorp, Inc.), (“The provision of one exemption in a statute implicitly denies the existence of other unstated exemptions.”) ( (“[T]he expression of one or more items of a class indicates an intent to exclude all elements of the same class which are not expressed.”)).

r, they are the best indicator of the authors’ intent and as a matter of judicial restraint we “must ‘apply it without resorting to other methods of statutory interpretation,’ unless application of the plain meaning would lead to impossible or absurd results.” N. Valley Emergency Specialists, ¶ 9 , (citation omitted)

(“Arizona‟s appellate courts have considered the victim‟s right to decline a defense interview „absolute.‟”) 6 ¶11 The Franklins argue the scope of the VBR does not protect victims from civil depositions because it provides that victims have the right “[t]o be treated with 5 Our dissenting colleague bases a contrary view on his premise that the VBR is “ambiguous” in

.” 5 13-4440.5 (providing historical overview).

(discussing the history of the Victims’ Bill of Rights and related statutes and court rules); Stellisa Scott, Note, Beyond, the Victims’ Bill of Rights: The Shield Becomes a Sword, 36 Ariz. L.Rev.

our constitution.” Knapp, 170 Ariz. at 239 , 823 P.2d at 687

(expression of one or more items of a class in a statute is construed as excluding those items not enumerated).

See Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 2.1

at 279, ¶ 18, 981 P.2d at 579 ( , ).

(special action jurisdiction accepted to address legislative restrictions of the Victims’ Bill of Rights); State ex rel.

Thus, we cannot assume the legislature intended to exempt civil enforcement of municipal ordinances from the attorney fee provision of § 12-348(A) simply because it chose 15 to do so in a distinct but procedurally analogous realm of civil traffic enforcement actions.3 (“‘A well established rule of statutory construction provides that the expression of one or more items of a class indicates an intent to exclude all items of the same class which are not expressed.’”)

703, 705 (1996) (finding‘ provision of Rules of Criminal Procedure superseded by Victim's Bill of Rights); P.2d 1297 (l996) (same).