Cited by

“Opinions formed by the judge on the basis of facts introduced or events occurring in the course of the current proceedings, or of prior proceedings, do not constitute a basis for a bias or partiality motion unless they display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.” (quoting Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555-56 (1994)).

¶19 A trial judge is presumed to be unbiased, and to rebut the presumption, a party must prove bias or prejudice by a preponderance of the evidence, -05, ¶ 24, -60 (App. 2000).

(“Opinions formed by the judge on the basis of facts introduced or events occurring in the course of the current proceedings .

(holding that, for public policy reasons, the mere filing of a bar complaint by a defendant against his attorney does not mandate removal of the attorney).

3 Such disagreements do not amount to 3 Hernandez’s arguments may be raised in a Rule 32 petition for post-conviction relief.

Lamar, 205 Ariz. at 435-36, ¶ 22 , 72 P.3d at 835-36 (stating upon compliance with requirements request to proceed pro se should be granted (citing Armant v. Marquez, 772 F.2d 552, 555 (9th Cir.1985))); Cornell, 179 Ariz. at 324 , 878 P.2d at 1362 (same); , (“If timely, the request ordinarily should be granted.”); Martin, 102 Ariz. at 145 , 426 P.2d at 642 (stating once defendant waives counsel and court determines waiver is effective, court lacks authority to thrust counsel on defendant).

(court has discretion to utilize measures necessary for orderly sentencing).

¶61 We find this case more like State v. Henry (Henry II), P.2d 57 (1997), than Marlow.

18 fair judgment impossible.” Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994)

“[O]pinions formed by the judge on the basis of facts introduced or events occurring in the course of the current proceedings, or of prior proceedings, do not constitute a basis for a bias or partiality motion unless they display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.” quoting Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555-56, 114 S. Ct. 1147, 1157, 127 L. Ed. 2d 474, 491 (1994).

-47, -62 (1997); -87, -70 (1987); see also Moody, 192 Ariz. at 508- 09, ¶ 21, 968 P.2d at 581-82.

quoting Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555-56 , 114 S.Ct.

See State v. Henry, 189 Ariz. 542, 547, (finding that a disagreement over tactical decisions that may raise concerns about an attorney’s competence is more properly analyzed in a post- conviction relief proceeding); State v. Tejeda, 677 N.W.2d 744, 751

¶ 19 , the Arizona Supreme Court reviewed a trial court’s disposition of a similar situation.

If his allegations proved true, they would necessitate new counsel, because “the presence of a genuine irreconcilable conflict requires the appointment of new counsel.”

See, , (“Motions for self-representation must be balanced against the ‘government’s right to a fair trial conducted in a judicious, orderly fashion.’ ”) (citations omitted).

This court has held that a felony murder instruction “may be mitigating where there is some doubt as to a defendant’s specific intent to' kill.”