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Opinions in Arizona that cite State v. Tarango, 914 P.2d 1300.

93 citing documents.

Hughes v. Jorgenson 50 P.3d 821 Ariz. 2002
Hughes v. Jorgenson 50 P.3d 821 Ariz. 2002
See United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347-49 (1971) (due process requires that ambiguities in criminal statutes be construed in favor of the defendant); State v. Tarango, 185 Ariz. 208, 210, (if “statute is susceptible to more than one interpretation, .
State v. Christian 47 P.3d 666 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2002
Norgord v. State Ex Rel. Berning 33 P.3d 1166 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2001
Norgord v. State Ex Rel. Berning 33 P.3d 1166 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2001
State Ex Rel. Pennartz v. Olcavage 30 P.3d 649 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2001
State Ex Rel. Pennartz v. Olcavage 30 P.3d 649 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2001
(applying this doctrine to harmonize two apparently conflicting sentencing enhancement provisions of Title 13) (citations omitted).
Unum Life Insurance Co. of America v. Craig 26 P.3d 510 Ariz. 2001
Unum Life Insurance Co. of America v. Craig 26 P.3d 510 Ariz. 2001
State v. Ossana 18 P.3d 1258 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2001
State v. Ossana 18 P.3d 1258 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2001
Furthermore, because ¶ 13-901.01(G) is ambiguous as to whether preparatory offenses are included in its purview, we apply the rule of lenity, which “ ‘dictates that any doubt should be resolved in favor of the defendant.’ ” , -50 , -49 (App.1983) ( , ).
In Re Moises L. 18 P.3d 1231 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2001
In Re Moises L. 18 P.3d 1231 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2001
In so doing, we undertake to “avoid rendering statutory language superfluous, void, contradictory, or insignificant.”
State v. Donald 10 P.3d 1193 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2000
State v. Donald 10 P.3d 1193 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2000
that the trial court improperly subjected him to both an enhanced sentence under A.R.S.
State v. Thompson 7 P.3d 151 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2000
State v. Thompson 7 P.3d 151 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2000
State v. French 7 P.3d 128 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2000
State v. French 7 P.3d 128 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2000
4 (1997), was a significant change in law, requiring the state to show that an accused committed other acts by clear and convincing evidence; (2) the court’s instruction characterizing prior acts as “bad acts” , (3) the sentence had to be amended in accordance with our memorandum decision; (4) , and State v. Arizona Dep’t of Corrections, , some of his flat-time terms must be modified to make him eligible for release after serving two-thirds of each sentence, and any release credits to which he m
State v. Wolter 3 P.3d 1110 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2000
State v. Wolter 3 P.3d 1110 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2000
If a criminal statute is “susceptible to more than one interpretation, the rule of lenity dictates that any doubt should be resolved in favor of the defendant.” , (-50 , -9 (App. 1983)).
State v. Murray 982 P.2d 1287 Ariz. 1999
State v. Murray 982 P.2d 1287 Ariz. 1999
Calik v. Superior Court 979 P.2d 1 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1999
Calik v. Superior Court 979 P.2d 1 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1999
aff'd on reh’g by State v. Arizona Dep’t of Corrections
State v. Johnson 991 P.2d 256 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1999
State v. Johnson 991 P.2d 256 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1999
¶ 1 The state petitions for review of the trial court’s order granting respondent’s
Champlin v. Sargeant 965 P.2d 763 Ariz. 1998
Champlin v. Sargeant 965 P.2d 763 Ariz. 1998
State v. Raboy 972 P.2d 1032 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1998
State v. Raboy 972 P.2d 1032 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1998
In his notice, he argued that, , he could not be sentenced to a flat-time, enhanced term of imprisonment because the enhancement statute specifically provides for.
State v. McDonald 960 P.2d 644 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1998
State v. McDonald 960 P.2d 644 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1998
section 13-604 , aff'd, , the maximum sentence which can be imposed is fifteen years.
State v. One Single Family Residence At 1810 East Second Avenue 969 P.2d 166 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1997
State v. One Single Family Residence At 1810 East Second Avenue 969 P.2d 166 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1997
See, , approved, , , -19 , -53 (App.1982); United States v. Innie, 7 F.3d 840, 844 (9th Cir.1993).
Bolton v. SUPERIOR COURT (STATE) 945 P.2d 1332 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1997
Bolton v. SUPERIOR COURT (STATE) 945 P.2d 1332 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1997
Defendant argues that section 13-901.01(F) is “susceptible to more than one interpretation, [and] the rule of lenity dictates that any doubt should be resolved in favor of the defendant.”
State v. Garcia 943 P.2d 870 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1997
State v. Garcia 943 P.2d 870 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1997
any doubt should be resolved in favor of the defendant.’ ” , (-50 , -49 (App.1983), decision approved and adopted, , ), affd on reh’g, State v. Arizona Dep’t of Corrections
Babe Investment v. Arizona Corp. Commission 939 P.2d 425 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1997
Babe Investment v. Arizona Corp. Commission 939 P.2d 425 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1997
State v. Arizona Department of Corrections 928 P.2d 635 Ariz. 1996
State v. Arizona Department of Corrections 928 P.2d 635 Ariz. 1996
The State of Arizona brought this special action to request clarification of this court’s

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