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The superior court must provide a lesser- included offense instruction only when the absence of such an instruction “would fundamentally violate [the] defendant’s right to a fair trial” and “interferes with [the] defendant’s ability to conduct his defense.” -09 (1996).

Instead, the court has a duty to provide such an instruction only when its omission “would fundamentally violate [the] defendant’s right to a fair trial” and interfere with the “defendant’s ability to conduct his defense.” –08 (1996).

Instead, the court has a duty to provide a lesser-included offense instruction only when the absence of such an instruction “would fundamentally violate [the] defendant’s right to a fair trial” and interfere with the defendant’s “ability to conduct h[er] defense.” –09 (1996).

cause he was unaware that he would be questioned about a homicide; “[W]e hold that a suspect’s awareness of all the possible subjects of questioning in advance of interrogation is not relevant to determining whether the suspect voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his [Miranda rights].”); (rejecting defendant’s challenge to voluntariness of his waiver when defendant waived Miranda rights and answered questions after “police informed him only that he was being arrested for the sexual

-69 (1982); (concluding evidence introduced on redirect examination of victim was within the scope of cross-examination, given the defendant’s cross-examination attack on purported inconsistencies in the victim’s direct testimony), 7 STATE v. HARRELL Decision of the Court (holding a defendant was not entitled to recross-examination when redirect examination raised “nothing new”).

Under such circumstances, “unless failure to instruct the jury would fundamentally violate defendant’s right to a fair trial, the court is under no obligation to give the charge, absent a request.” –08 (1996); see also Ariz. R. Crim.

¶14 Gonzales claims nonetheless that intent and knowledge are insufficient justifications for admission of Rule 404(b) evidence when the defense denies the act occurred, – 110 (1996).

Instead, the court has a duty to provide a lesser-included offense instruction only when the absence of such an instruction “would fundamentally violate [the] defendant’s right to a fair trial” and interfere with the defendant’s “ability to conduct his defense.” –08 (1996).

274 P.3d at 514 (noting proponent must “satisffy] Rule 404(c)’s prerequisites”); , (acknowledging burden under Rule 404(b)); , (emphasizing that proponent of other-act evidence must show Rule 403 balance favors admission); , (recognizing proponent’s burden under case law predating Rule 404(c)); -62 , -44 (App. 1981) (same).

we would not reverse Parker’s conviction “unless the record affirmatively shows that defendant was not tried by a fair and impartial jury.” (error in striking juror for cause does not require reversal absent showing that a fair and impartial jury was not secured)

¶11 Third, to admit another act as evidence of a common scheme or plan pursuant to Rule 404(b), the other act must be “part of ‘a particular plan of which the charged crime is a part.’” ( ).

A common scheme or plan, under Rule 13.3(a)(3), is a “particular plan of which the charged crime is a part.” ¶ 45, ( ).

nt a ‘common scheme or plan’ is alleged, ‘the state must demonstrate that the other act is part of a particular plan of which the charged crime is a part.’” He relies on State v. Ives, in which the court concluded the defendant’s four acts of child molestation, “separated in time by as much as seven years or more, [were] not acts of ‘a particular plan of which the charged crime [was] part.’” -09, -69 (1996), -33, -09 (App. 1987).

¶45 For purposes of Rule 13.3(a)(3), a “common scheme or plan” is a “particular plan of which the charged crime is a part.” (internal quotation omitted).

(“[a]rgument must be in the body of the brief,” and text in appendix stricken), P.2d 762 (1996); State v. Bolton, 182 Ariz. 290, 298, (argument not within body of brief procedurally defaulted).

Cf. State v. Walden, 183 Ariz. 595, 618, (finding signs of a struggle when victim’s hands were intertwined in the electrical cord used to strangle her and blood was sprayed around the room), -78, -86 (1990) (noting as evidence supporting cruelty that “[t]he crime scene exhibited signs of a violent and bloody struggle”).

-16, -95 (1995), overruled on other grounds by State v. Ives, 187 Ariz. 102

Aguilar, 209 Ariz. at 51, ¶ 38 , 97 P.3d at 876 ( , ).

-11 , -71 (1996) -73 , -50 (App. 1989) helpful.