Cited by

Instead, as the Arizona Supreme Court explained, it is a “commonsense, nontechnical concept[ ] that deal[s] with ‘the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.’” (quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 695 (1996)).

(“In reviewing investigatory stops[,] we defer to the trial court’s findings of fact absent abuse of discretion.”).

(stating an investigatory stop is a seizure that is justified under the Fourth Amendment if it is “‘supported by reasonable suspicion’ that criminal activity is afoot”) (quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 693 (1996)).

An investigatory stop is a seizure that is justified under the Fourth Amendment if it is “‘supported by reasonable suspicion’ that criminal activity is afoot.” (quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 693 (1996)).

¶12 (4-1 decision) in arguing that “[s]uspicious circumstances do not necessarily support a particularized and objective basis for an investigative stop.” Rogers, however, is distinguishable.

(citing Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996)).

Such a stop is constitutional at its inception “‘if supported by reasonable suspicion’ that criminal activity is afoot.” quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 693 (1996); (“‘[I]f police have a reasonable suspicion, grounded in specific and articulable facts, that a person they encounter was involved in or is wanted in conn

But “whether an officer had a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity that justified conducting an investigatory stop is a mixed question of law and fact which we review de novo.”

er she provided the name, the encounter became nonconsensual because she tried to walk away but was followed and questioned by Officer C. As the State correctly points out and the trial court held in part, by that point the Officers had established reasonable suspicion that Condiff had committed a crime because she had 3 to support her argument that her acquiescence was not consensual.

¶15 Additionally, P.2d 1027 (1996), to argue that the law before Rodriguez did not permit the dog sniff.

–10, –29 (1996) (finding that a reasonable person would not feel free to leave when the officer held out his badge and stated, “police officers, we need to talk to you”); see also Gentry v. Sevier, 597 F.3d 838, 844–45 (7th Cir. 2010) (concluding that a Terry stop occurred when the “officer exit

¶ 14 A limited investigatory stop “‘is permissible under the Fourth Amendment if supported by reasonable suspicion’ that criminal activity is afoot.” , quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 693 , 116 S.Ct.

Whether a defendant has abandoned property is a factual determination, that we review for clear and manifest error, 1 At the hearing on Huerta‟s motion to suppress, the arresting officer initially testified that when asked, Huerta indicated the duffle bag was not his.

However, “we defer to the trial court’s findings of fact absent abuse of discretion.” , Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 694 n. 3, 699, 116 S.Ct.

¶ 5 We review de novo whether there was reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop, , and defer to the trial court’s factual findings that are supported by the record, , viewing them in the light most favorable to upholding the trial court’s ruling

1870 , 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980); -11 , -1030 (1996) (holding seizure occurred where officers who approached defendant, said, “we need to talk to you”).

-11 , -30 (1996) (a person is in custody when police officers, suspecting criminal activity, approach a suspect and say, “police officers, we need to talk to you.”) , (a person is not in custody when police officers lawfully sto

Although we review de novo whether the police had reasonable suspicion to justify an investigatory stop, we defer to the trial court’s findings of fact and “give due weight to inferences drawn from those facts by resident judges and local law enforcement officers,” Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996).

“We review de novo the court’s ultimate legal determination of the propriety of a stop as a ‘mixed question of law and fact.’” Id.

¶ 25 , which involved a frisk after an illegal stop.