Cited by

¶16 Additionally, the Rule 404(c) instruction here did not improperly express the court’s “opinion as to what the evidence proves.” See Riley, ( ¶¶ 28- 29 (1998)).

A party is entitled to jury instructions “on any theory reasonably supported by the evidence.” ¶ 16 (1998).

“A party is entitled to an instruction on any theory reasonably supported by the evidence.” ¶ 16 (1998).

A court improperly comments on evidence when the court “express[es] an opinion as to what the evidence proves in a way that interferes with the jury’s independent evaluation of that evidence.” ¶ 85 (2020) ( ¶ 29 (1998)) (cleaned up).

“A party is entitled to an instruction on any theory reasonably supported by the evidence.” ¶ 16 (1998).

In determining whether the court properly instructed a jury, the test is whether “the instructions adequately set forth the law applicable to the case.” -62, ¶ 16 (1998).

A court “violate[s] Arizona’s constitutional prohibition against commenting on the evidence” if it “express[es] an opinion as to what the evidence proves.” ¶ 29 (1998).

¶¶ 31-34 (App. 2002); -62, ¶ 16 (1998).

¶ 16 (1998) (“A party is entitled to an instruction on any theory reasonably supported by the evidence.”).

The court may issue a jury instruction “on any theory reasonably supported by the evidence.” ¶ 16 (1998).

Although parties are generally entitled to an instruction on any reasonably supported theory, courts need not give an instruction “when its substance is adequately covered by other instructions.” ¶ 16 (1998).

See Ariz. Const. art. 6, § 27 (“Judges shall not charge juries with respect to matters of fact, nor comment thereon, but shall declare the law.”); ¶ 29 (1998) (superior court cannot “express an opinion as to what the evidence proves” or “interfere with the jury’s independent evaluation of that evidence”).

The court may provide a jury instruction “on any theory reasonably supported by the evidence.” ¶ 16 (1998).

“A party is entitled to an instruction on any theory reasonably supported by the evidence.”

rule is not unconstitutional.”); see also State v. (Thomas) West, (“The felony-murder rule, designed as it is to protect human life, represents sound public policy, is reasonably related to the end sought to be accomplished and is not constitutionally impermissible.” ()), ¶ 30 n.7 (1998).

¶33 Despite Parker, for the proposition that the third-party culpability instruction was required.

¶ 16 (1998) (holding the superior court need not give every requested instruction if the instructions adequately cover the law).

¶18 “A party is entitled to an instruction on any theory reasonably supported by the evidence.” ¶ 16 (1998).

“A party is entitled to an instruction on any theory reasonably supported by the evidence,” but we “will not reverse a conviction if we can conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error had no influence on the verdict.” 63, ¶¶ 16, 27 (1998).

overruled on other grounds, ¶ 30 n.7 (1998); see also Organ, 225 Ariz. at 48, ¶ 24.

¶ 16 (1998) (holding a trial court need not give every specific instruction requested by the defense: “the test is whether the [given] instructions adequately set forth the law applicable to the case”).

A judge violates Arizona’s constitutional prohibition against commenting on evidence by expressing “an opinion as to what the evidence proves,” in a way that interferes “with the jury’s independent evaluation of that evidence.” ¶¶ 28–29 (1998); see also Ariz. Const. art. 6, § 27.