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The court should reject instructions that misstate the law or would be misleading or confusing to the jury; “the test is whether the instructions adequately set forth the law applicable to the case.” - 10 (1998).

See, ¶¶ 11-13 & n.4, -09 & n.4 (1998) (“At trial, uncontroverted expert testimony established that palm prints are identical to fingerprints with respect to their power to match and identify members of the population.”).

(overruled on other grounds by State v. Rodriguez, 192 16 STATE v. CRAFT Decision of the Court Ariz. 58, 64, ¶ 30, n.7

In Arizona, a defendant generally is entitled to a jury instruction “on any theory reasonably supported by the evidence.” -38, -82 (App. 1983) (even if court denies motion to suppress statements on voluntariness grounds, defendant entitled to voluntariness instruction “if the evidence has raised a question for the jury”).5 In making this assess

See, ¶ 25 , (“A defendant is not required to prove an alibi; rather, the jury must acquit a defendant if the alibi evidence raises a reasonable doubt about whether the defendant committed the crime.”); ¶ 11 , (similar for misidentific

See State v. West, 176 Ariz. 432, 437, (defendant bragging to multiple people about murdering older man and describing how he killed him was relishing), P.2d 1006 (1998).

However, in a criminal ease, “[a] pretrial motion in limine is merely a convenient substitute for evidentiary objections at trial.” , , 64 n. 7, , 1012 n. 7 (1998).

And, because it is the state‟s duty to “seek justice, not merely a conviction,” the probative features of such evidence cannot themselves be unduly prejudicial to the state.6 5 We discuss prejudice here as a separate concept from the risk of confusion.

at 433-34 ¶ 18, 207 P.3d at 686-87 ( P.2d 1006 (1998)).

3 ¶6 “A party is entitled to an instruction on any theory reasonably supported by the evidence.”

504, 514, ¶ 35, (relishing demonstrated by defendant “laughing out loud,” joking, and looking forward to media coverage); (bragging about beating victim shows that defendant relished his crime), overruled on other grounds, n.7, ¶ 30, n.7 (1998); State v. Runningeagle, 176 Ariz. 59, 65, (laughing immediately after murder and bragging to girlfriend constitute relishing); cf. Greene, 192 Ariz. at 441, ¶ 40, 967 P.2d

(upholding stipulation in death penalty case that defendant committed a crime of violence that constituted an aggravating circumstance), , 64 n. 7, ¶ 30, , 1012 n. 7 (1998); see Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 451-52 , 85 S.Ct.

He contended for the first time that our supreme court’s P.2d 1006 (1998), controls and it required the court to give such an instruction.

“A party is entitled to an instruction on any theory reasonably supported by the evidence.” ¶ 16

overruled on other grounds, P.2d 1006 (1998); and Greenway, 170 Ariz. at 164, 823 P.2d at 33.

ries with respect to matters of fact, nor comment thereon, but shall declare the law.” To violate this constitutional prohibition against commenting on the evidence, “‘the court must express an opinion as to what the evidence proves’ or ‘interfere with the jury’s independent evaluation of that evidence.’ ”

State v. West, 176 Ariz. 432, 454, P.2d 1006 (1995); Greenway, 170 Ariz. at 164, 823 P.2d at 31.

¶17 A trial court is not obligated to give a proposed jury instruction “when its substance is adequately covered by other instructions,” ¶ 16, or if it is an incorrect statement of law.

te are correct that a defendant would never be entitled to have a jury instructed on armed robbery as a lesser-included offense of felony murder, , (observing that “this court has consistently held that felony murder contains no lesser included homicide offenses”) (emphasis added), , this does not mean that the two offenses are not the “same” for purposes of double jeopardy analysis.

To violate this - 33 - prohibition, “the court must express an opinion as to what the evidence proves” or “interfere with the jury’s independent evaluation of that evidence.” ¶ 29, (citations omitted).

P.2d 1006 (1998); Greenway, 170 Ariz. at 164, 823 P.2d at 31.

¶ 27, (stating court will not reverse a conviction if it can conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that an error did not influence the verdict).