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“To prevail on a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, a defendant must demonstrate that the prosecutor’s misconduct ‘so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.’“ ¶ 26 (1998) (quoting Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974)).

Context, as well as the trial evidence, including the recording of the home invasion, show the statements were not “calculated to direct the jurors’ attention to the defendant’s exercise of his fifth amendment privilege.” ¶ 64 (1998) (citation omitted).

“To prevail on a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, a defendant must demonstrate that the prosecutor’s misconduct so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” ¶ 26 (1998) (quotation omitted).

To establish a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, a defendant must show “the prosecutor’s misconduct so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” ¶ 193 (2016) ( ¶ 26 (1998)).

¶9 We therefore address whether the totality of the prosecutor’s actions that Eshaya identifies as misconduct “so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process,” ¶ 26 (1998) (quoting Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974)), bearing in mind that reversal is required “only when misconduct is ‘so pronounced and persistent that it permeated the entire atmosphere of the trial, indicating that the prosecutor intentionally engaged in imprope

The misconduct must have “so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” ¶ 26 (1998) (quoting Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974)).

¶12 Prosecutorial misconduct must be so egregious that it “infect[s] the trial with unfairness” such that the “resulting conviction is a denial of due process.” ¶ 26 (1998) (citation omitted).

–79, ¶ 25 (1988) (stating the general rule of not recognizing cumulative error, with the exception of claims involving prosecutorial misconduct).

(internal quotation marks omitted) ( ¶ 26 (1998)).

¶92 “To prevail on a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, a defendant must demonstrate that the prosecutor’s misconduct ‘so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.’” ¶ 26 (1998) (quoting Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974)).

State v. Burns , , ¶ 146, quoting State v. Hughes , , ¶ 26

¶ 26 (1998) (citations omitted).

¶ 26 (1998) (holding that reversal for prosecutorial misconduct is warranted only when the misconduct, viewed cumulatively, “so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process” and was “so pronounced and persistent that it permeate[d] the entire atmosphere of the tri

¶18 “To prevail on a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, a defendant must demonstrate that the prosecutor’s misconduct ‘so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.’” ¶ 26 (1998) (quoting Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974)).

The defendant must prove “the prosecutor’s misconduct ‘so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.’” ¶ 26 (1998) (quoting Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974)).

3 In analyzing issues of prosecutor’s comments which may give rise to reversible cumulative error, we examine whether the cumulative effect of individual allegations “so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” ¶ 26 (1998).

The defendant must also demonstrate “that the prosecutor’s misconduct ‘so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.’” ¶ 26 (1998) (quoting Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974)).

“[A] defendant must demonstrate that the prosecutor’s misconduct ‘so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.’” ¶ 26 (1998) (quoting Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974)); (stating that, to justify reversal, the misconduct “must be ‘so pronounced and persistent that it permeates the entire atmosphere of the trial’” (citations omitted)).

¶¶ 10-11, 16-19; ¶ 26 (1998) (“To prevail on a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, a defendant must demonstrate that the prosecutor’s misconduct so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the 1Absent material revisions after the relevant dates, statutes and rules cited refer to the current version unless otherwise indicated

¶ 59 (1998) ("Jury argument that impugns the integrity or honesty of opposing counsel is .

¶ 33 (1998); see also Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) ("[United States Attorney] is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law."); State v. Lead Indus.