Cited by

See, ¶ 31 (1999) (finding right to counsel waived when a defendant initially requested a lawyer, but subsequently volunteered information after saying “I don’t see why I shouldn’t just tell you”); –6 ¶¶ 10–14 (2002), supplemented, –49 ¶¶ 10–14 (2003) (finding right to co

Even if a suspect has caused a custodial interrogation to end (by, for example, invoking the right to counsel), once a “suspect reinitiates contact with the police, he waives his rights and questioning can continue.” ¶ 22 (1999).

¶ 14 (1999) ("Coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to the finding that a confession is not voluntary[.]

¶ 36 (1999); ¶ 22 (2008).

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (suspect’s statements made during an in-custody interrogation are only admissible if police have informed the suspect of his or her constitutional rights before questioning); ¶ 18 (1999).

at 187 ¶ 28; ¶ 48 (1999) (“[T]he legislature determined that the young and old are especially vulnerable and should be protected.

Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 617–20 (1976); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 474, 478-79 (1966); ¶ 14 (2012); ¶ 18 (1999).

“When evaluating coercion, the defendant’s physical and mental states are relevant to determine susceptibility to coercion, but alone are not enough to render a statement involuntary.” ¶ 14, (citation omitted); cf. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 396-402 (1978) (holding that a defendant’s statements were involuntary because evidence showed the defendant’s will was overborne by the police detective’s unceasing interrogation “of a seriously and painfully wounded man on

3 STATE v. CRUZ Decision of the Court ¶8 “Miranda’s procedural safeguards apply only to custodial interrogation.” ¶ 18

Miranda’s protections, however, “apply only to custodial interrogation.” (“Police are free to ask questions of a person who is not in custody without having to give the person any warnings under Miranda.”).

¶ 48, (“[T]he age of the victim is relevant to an inquiry into the defendant’s characteristics and 33 STATE V. FORDE Opinion of the Court propensities.

cf. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 398-402 (1978) (confession involuntary where defendant seriously wounded, evidently confused, still in hospital’s intensive care unit and encumbered by medical apparatus, complained of “unbearable” pain, asked for the interrogation to stop, and

statements [made to police officers] are admissible.” (“Answering questions after police properly give the Miranda warnings constitutes a waiver by conduct.”).

-60, ¶ 32 , -39 (1999) (spontaneous statements admissible); United States v. Chipps, 410 F.3d 438, 445 (8th Cir.2005) (same).

Anderson II, 210 Ariz. at 343, ¶ 59, 111 P.3d at 385 (“In any event, the jury returned separate guilty verdicts for both felony murder and premeditated murder as to each victim; therefore, the first-degree murder convictions would stand even absent a felony murder predicate.”); cf. State v. Smith (Todd), ¶¶ 34-36, (declining to address issue with premeditation instruction because defendant failed to challenge conviction for felony murder).

See State v. Smith, 193 Ariz. 452, 459 ¶ 29

See id.; *75 ¶¶ 19-20 , (holding that officer’s response, “What meth?”, to defendant’s comment that he had recently used methamphetamine did not constitute interrogation because the officer’s statements “were not made ...

¶ 22, ¶ 22 (1999); see also Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1043-44, 103 S.Ct.

For example, in State v. Smith, 193 Ariz. 452, 459, ¶ 31, ¶ 31 (1999), we held that although the defendant initially requested counsel, he waived his right to counsel when he reinitiated contact with the police by stating, “I don’t see why I shouldn’t just tell you.” ¶15 The Pima County Sheriff’s Department conducted two video- tape