Cited by

Washington v. Recuenco, 548 U.S. 212, 218–19 & n.2 (2006); –53, ¶¶ 45–46 (2003); see also United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 (1984).

Structural errors are those which “deprive defendants of ‘basic protections’ without which ‘a criminal trial cannot reliably serve its function as a vehicle for determination of guilt or innocence.’” ¶ 45 (2003) (quoting Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1999) (citation omitted).

and no criminal punishment may be regarded as fundamentally fair.” ¶ 45 (2003) (quotations and citations omitted).

¶¶ 7-9 (2003) (by virtue of jury verdicts convicting a capital defendant of the kidnapping of a minor under 15 years of age, the jury implicitly found the aggravating circumstance that the murder victim was under 15 years of age); ¶ 83 (2003) (age of victim as aggravating circumstance can be implicit in jury verdict when defendant is simultaneously convicted of a relevant age- dependent crime).

ial court identified the sentence for possession of drug paraphernalia as a “slightly aggravated” term of 1.5 years’ imprisonment in both the oral pronouncement of sentence and the related 4 Although Jackson argues that using the 1981 conviction as an historical felony results in double jeopardy, “[d]ouble jeopardy principles generally do not apply to sentencing proceedings.” (citing United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 132 (1980)).

¶ 76 (2003) (“The state must establish the connection between the murder and [pecuniary gain] motive through direct or strong circumstantial evidence.”).

5 See *387 State v. Armstrong , , ¶ 20, , 385 (2008) (harmless-error review places burden on state to prove beyond reasonable doubt that error did not contribute to or affect sentencing outcome); cf. State v. Ring , , ¶ 79, , 941 (2003) ("In those instances in which no reasonable jury could find that the state failed to prove a pecuniary gain motive beyond a reasonable doubt, we will find harmless error affecting that factor.").

State v. Ring ( Ring III ), , 552-53 ¶¶ 45-46, , 933-34 (2003) (quoting Neder v. United States , 527 U.S. 1 , 8, 119 S.Ct.

2246 , 141 L.Ed.2d 615 (1998), "there is no double jeopardy bar against a retrial" of a non-capital sentencing allegation; (2) pursuant to State v. Ring , , double jeopardy principles would not apply because Barnes was not "impliedly or actually acquitted on the merits"; and (3) Barnes waived any double jeopardy claim because he "both consented to the discharge of the jury, and affirmatively argued against having the jury stay to deliberate the issue

Exp., Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989) (“If a precedent of this Court has direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow the case which directly controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions.”); ¶ 61 (2003) (“We cannot ignore a Supreme Court decision interpreting federal law unless the Court expressly overrules or casts cognizable doubt on that decision.”); see also Sparks,

¶6 “When ‘a defendant stipulates, confesses or admits to facts sufficient to establish an aggravating circumstance, [the court] will regard that factor as established.’” ¶ 51 (2004), ¶ 93 (2003).

r, it implicitly found the aggravating factor of “severe injuries and death of the victim”); n.2, ¶ 10, n.2 (2003) (holding that when a jury simultaneously convicts a defendant of first degree murder and deadly or dangerous assault by a prisoner, it implicitly finds the aggravating factor of murder while in the custody of ADOC); ¶ 83, (explaining that when a jury convicts a defendant of first degree murder and another crime against the victim in which the age of the victim constitutes a substant

1246 , 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991), and has only been found to exist in limited instances, none of which apply here, , -34 (2003).

¶9 Structural errors “deprive defendants of basic protections without which a criminal trial cannot reliably serve its function as a vehicle for determination of guilt or innocence.” State v. Ring (Ring III), ¶ 45, (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1999)).

Structural errors “deprive defendants of basic protections without which a criminal trial cannot reliably serve its function as a vehicle for determination of guilt or innocence.” Neder v. United States, 571 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1999) (citation and quotations omitted); ¶ 10 (2009); ¶ 45 (2003).

824 (declining to adopt rule that all federal constitutional errors are harmful); , (noting constitutional error may be harmless).

And “[a] capital trial comprises just one trial, divided into guilt and sentencing phases, and has always been understood as such, by this court and by the U.S. Supreme Court.” ¶ 50 n.19, n.19 (2003).

Structural errors, as opposed to more typical trial errors, “deprive defendants of basic protections without which a criminal trial cannot reliably serve its function as a vehicle for determination of guilt or innocence.” State v. Ring (Ring III), ¶ 45, (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1999)).

stituted an abuse of the subpoena [power] and denied [him] a public trial.” He acknowledges raising this argument for the first time on appeal, but he asserts denial of a public trial constitutes structural error, relying on State v. Ring, in which our supreme court noted that denial of a public criminal trial is one of the “relatively few instances in which we should regard error as structural.” -34 (2003), citing Waller, 467 U.S. 39.

I. Structural Error ¶9 Structural error is error that infects “’the entire trial process’ from beginning to end.” ¶ 46 (2003) (quoting Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8 (1999)).

¶ 46 (2003) (enumerating circumstances of structural error: a trial judge is biased; a defendant is denied counsel, access to counsel, self- representation, or a public trial; the reasonable doubt instruction is defective; or jurors were excluded because of race or views on the death penalty).