Cited by

rev’d on other grounds, Ring v. Arizona (“Ring II”), 536 U.S. 584 (2002).

n.4, ¶ 33 (2001), rev’d on other grounds by Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002) (“Labeling untimely motions as supplemental does not enable a party to avoid the time restrictions imposed by procedural rules.”).

(Ring I), rev’d on other grounds by Ring II.

Factual and Statutory Background ¶23 We review the denial of a motion to suppress wiretap evidence for an abuse of discretion, State v. Ring, 200 Ariz. 267, 273 ¶ 14, rev’d on other grounds, Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), and review questions of constitutional and statutory interpretation de novo, State v. Armstrong, 218 Ariz.

(Ring I), rev’d on other grounds by Ring II.

(Ring I), rev’d on other grounds by Ring II.

(Ring I), rev’d on other grounds by Ring II.

rev’d on other grounds, Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S. Ct. 2428 (2002).

(Ring I), rev’d on other grounds by Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S. Ct. 2428, 2443 (2002).

We rejected the first contention in State v. Pandeli (Pandeli I), ¶ 90, vacated on other grounds by Pandeli v. Arizona (Pandeli II), 536 U.S. 953 (2002); we rejected the second in State v. 25 Ring (Ring I), ¶ 64, rev’d on other grounds by Ring II, 536 U.S. at 584.

This Court rejected this argument in State v. Ring (Ring I), ¶ 64, rev’d on other grounds by Ring II, 536 U.S. at 584.

rev’d on other grounds, Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).

¶3 In 2002, the United States Supreme Court reversed the Arizona Supreme Court’s P.3d 1139 (2001) (Ring I), and held in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 588, 609, 122 S. Ct. 2428, 2432, 2443 (2002) (Ring II), that this state’s capital sentencing statutes were unconstitutional because they violated a defendant’s right to a jury trial as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States C

¶ 30 64, rev’d on other grounds, Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).

¶ 64, (Ring I), rev’d on other grounds by Ring II, 536 U.S. 584; ¶ 55

¶11 P.3d 1139 (2001) (“Ring I”), rev’d on other grounds by Ring II, 536 U.S. 584.

¶ 64, rev’d on other grounds, Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002).

2428 , 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002) (Ring II) (“Based solely on the jury’s verdict finding Ring guilty of first-degree felony murder, the maximum punishment he could have received was life imprisonment.”); ¶ 42 , (Ring I) (“The range of punishment allowed by law on the basis of the verdict alone is life imprisonment with the possibility of parole or imprisonment for ‘natural life’ without the possibility of release.”).

¶ 40 We find further support for the conclusion that either a natural life term or a life term with the possibility of parole is authorized by the jury verdict in those portions of our supreme court’s , (Ring I), that the United States Supreme Court cited with approval in Ring II..

P.3d 1139 (2001) 1 In Summerlin v. Stewart, 341 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2003), the court held that the rule announced in Ring II applies retroactively to cases on federal habeas review and concluded that a judge’s imposition of a death penalty “cannot be subject to harmless error analysis.” Id.

( Ring I ), and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its decision.

(Ring I), our supreme court stated: In Arizona, a defendant cannot be put to death solely on the basis of a jury’s verdict, regardless of the jury’s factual findings.

at 2443 (reversing Ring I, , ).

(Ring I), and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its decision.

(Ring I), and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its decision.