Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite State v. Murray, 982 P.2d 1287.

36 citing documents.

State of Arizona v. Ronnie Roy Vera 334 P.3d 754 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2014
State of Arizona v. Ronnie Roy Vera 334 P.3d 754 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2014
P.2d 1287 (1999), for the proposition that the legislature may not “‘change the legal consequence of events completed before [a] statute’s enactment,’” because “[t]he substantive legal consequence of past events is determined by the law in effect at the time of the event, and the determination of that law is for
State v. Bolding 253 P.3d 279 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2011
State v. Bolding 253 P.3d 279 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2011
¶¶ 13-16; ¶¶ 6-7, 9 , -89 (1999) ( , ).
State v. Montes 245 P.3d 879 Ariz. 2011
State v. Montes 245 P.3d 879 Ariz. 2011
¶12 In finding SB 1449 unconstitutional, P.2d 1287 (1999), P.3d 902 (App. 2004), aff’d on other grounds, 210 Ariz. 554
State v. Rios 237 P.3d 1052 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2010
State v. Rios 237 P.3d 1052 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2010
Young v. Beck 231 P.3d 940 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2010
Young v. Beck 231 P.3d 940 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2010
¶ 9 , (“[T]he separation of powers doctrine leaves creation of future statutory law to the legislative branch and determination of existing law and its application to past events to the judicial branch.”).
State v. Montes 223 P.3d 681 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2009
State v. Montes 223 P.3d 681 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2009
Citing our supreme court’s , the state claims that this court should deny Montes’s motion because Senate Bill 1449 “violates the [Separation of [Pjowers [Cjlause of the Arizona Constitution.” We review constitutional issues and other issues of law de novo.
State of Arizona v. Alvin Edward Williams Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2008
State of Arizona v. Alvin Edward Williams Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2008
¶16 P.2d 1287 (1999), however, Williams argues “[p]arole eligibility is a substantive right and it is implicated in the sentencing procedure that is applied.” But Murray is distinguishable and inapposite to the issue presented here.
State v. Hansen 160 P.3d 166 Ariz. 2007
State v. Hansen 160 P.3d 166 Ariz. 2007
¶ 6, (“Within constitutional limits, the legislature is vested with plenary power to change the substantive law prospectively .
David Garcia v. State of Arizona 146 P.3d 1007 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2006
David Garcia v. State of Arizona 146 P.3d 1007 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2006
See State v. Murray, 194 Ariz. 373, 374-75, -89 (1999) (“[T]he legislature’s intent about retroactive application ‘does not end our analysis.’”)
State v. Fell 115 P.3d 594 Ariz. 2005
State v. Fell 115 P.3d 594 Ariz. 2005
§ 13-604.01 as “clarification” where “[t]he amendment did not change that which was clear and distinct in the first place”), with State v. Murray, 194 Ariz. 373, (refusing to apply amendments to A.R.S.
Marriage of Cook v. Cook 104 P.3d 857 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2005
Marriage of Cook v. Cook 104 P.3d 857 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2005
Freight Sys., Inc., , (“[L]egislation may not retroactively disturb vested rights.”); ¶ 6 , (“[T]he legislature ...
State v. Fell 97 P.3d 902 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2004
State v. Fell 97 P.3d 902 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2004
O'BRIEN v. Escher 65 P.3d 107 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2003
O'BRIEN v. Escher 65 P.3d 107 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2003
Jeremy Sean O'Brien v. State Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2003
Jeremy Sean O'Brien v. State Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2003
State v. Towery 64 P.3d 828 Ariz. 2003
State of Arizona v. Roger Wayne Murray Ariz. 2003
State of Arizona v. Roger Wayne Murray Ariz. 2003
P.2d 1287 (1999); P.2d 784 (1997); P.2d 290 (1996); P.2d 1214 (1996).
State v. Towery 64 P.3d 828 Ariz. 2003
State v. Griffin 58 P.3d 516 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2002
State v. Griffin 58 P.3d 516 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2002
disturb[s] vested substantive rights by retroactively changing the law that applies to completed events.” San Carlos, , ; see also Shane B.; , ¶¶ 16, 24 , ¶¶ 16, 24 (App.1998).
State v. Thompson 7 P.3d 151 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2000
State v. Thompson 7 P.3d 151 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2000
¶ 5 , (stating that the legislature has the power to change sentencing provisions).