Cited by

¶ 42 (2001), ¶ 20 (2012).

-42 (App. 1983); (explaining that a jury’s guilty verdict makes any error in the charging decision harmless), ¶ 25 (2001), -43, ¶¶ 14-20 (2012).

STATE v. ETIENNE Decision of the Court “Reversal on the basis of prosecutorial misconduct requires that the conduct be so pronounced and persistent that it permeates the entire atmosphere of the trial.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted), ¶ 25 (2001); accord Lee, 189 Ariz. at 616.

disapproved of on other grounds, ¶ 25 (2001); 461 (1985) (analyzing attorney’s “failure to argue for petitioner’s alleged intoxication” as trial strategy); (attorney’s decision “as to what witnesses should be called .

a defendant demonstrates that trial publicity “was so extensive or outrageous that it permeated the proceedings or created a ‘carnival-like atmosphere,’” we “presume prejudice without a particularized examination of the publicity’s effect on the jury.” ( ¶ 25 (2001)).

–87 (App. 1993) (–97 (1992), ¶ 25 (2001)).

“Reversal on the basis of prosecutorial misconduct requires that the conduct be so pronounced and persistent that it permeates the entire atmosphere of the trial.” Hughes, 193 Ariz. at 79, ¶ 26 ( ¶ 25 (2001)).

We reverse for insufficient evidence only if there is a “complete absence of probative facts to support the conviction.” ¶ 25 (2001).

ing the aggravation phase of a capital trial in determining whether the court abused its discretion in admitting other act evidence); Anthony, 218 Ariz. at 443-45, ¶¶ 26-37 (reviewing evidence presented at trial to determine whether clear and convincing evidence supported other act evidence when the trial court admitted evidence based on the parties’ briefs and oral argument); ¶ 57 (2001) (concluding the evidence at trial satisfied Terrazas’ clear and convincing evidence standard), ¶ 20 (2012).

–05 (1992), ¶ 25 (2001).

¶25 Under Franks, “[a] trial court must suppress evidence seized pursuant to a warrant if a defendant proves, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the affiant knowingly, intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth made a false statement to obtain the warrant and that the false statement was necessary to a finding of probable cause.” ¶ 42 (2001)

Cf. State v. Nordstrom (Nordstrom I), ¶ 24, (finding no state action where a witness observed the defendant in a newscast of his arraignment); O’Connell v. Indiana, 742 N.E.2d 943, 948 (Ind.

¶17 Other-act evidence is admissible if (1) the evidence is admitted for a proper purpose, (2) the evidence is relevant, (3) the evidence is not unfairly prejudicial under Rule 403, and (4) the judge gives “an appropriate limiting instruction upon request.” ¶ 54 (2001), ¶ 20 (2012).

105, 402, 403 & 404(b); ¶ 54, P.3d 509 (2012).

¶¶ 23-24 (2001) (holding there was no state action potentially tainting a pretrial identification where a witness identified the 6 STATE v. WOODY Decision of the Court defendant based on a news broadcast of his arr

“‘Reversal on the basis of prosecutorial misconduct requires that the conduct be so pronounced and persistent that it permeates the entire atmosphere of the trial.’” Id., P.3d 717 (2001).

– 18 (1992) ( United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 73 (1986) (explaining that a jury’s guilty verdict makes any error in its charging decision harmless).

Juries are not so susceptible that they cannot measure intelligently the weight of identification testimony that has some questionable feature.” Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 116; ¶ 27, (noting that weaknesses in a witness’s testimony go not to admissibility, but “to [the testimony’s] weight and credibility, both matters for the jury to consider”), P.3d 509 (2012).

¶ 5 Declaring a mistrial “is the most drastic remedy for trial error” and should be granted “only when justice will be thwarted if the current jury is allowed to consider the case.”

The exclusion of the public, therefore, “is an extraordinary measure and should be done with caution[,]” ( ) opinion modified on denial of reconsideration (July 10, 1992) P.3d 717 (2001), especially when requested by a defendant and “would take from the public its right to be informed of a proceeding to which it is an interested party,” Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 101 Ariz. at 259, 418 P.2d at 596.

(holding “trial court has broad discretion in evidentiary matters”), ¶ 25, Dozier, 1 CA-CR 05-0463 at ¶¶ 35-40 (holding no abuse of discretion in excluding third-party culpability evidence).