Cited by

“A juror’s preconceived notions or opinions about a case do not necessarily render that juror incompetent to fairly and impartially sit in a case.”

do not necessarily render that juror incompetent to fairly and impartially sit on the case.” ¶ 28 (2000) (citation omitted).

“Rehabilitation” occurs when the court tries to remedy a juror’s “preconceived notions or opinions about a case.” ¶ 28 (2000); ¶ 24 (2018).

necessarily preclude the juror from serving on a jury; if the juror is ‘willing to put aside his opinions and base his decisions solely upon the evidence, he may serve.’” ¶ 19 (2007) ( ¶ 28 (2000)); see also Johnson, 247 Ariz. at 197 ¶ 109 (“[A] prospective juror is not precluded from serving on the jury simply because he favors the death penalty.”).

And “[t]o establish prejudice in the context of a plea agreement, a defendant must show a reasonable probability that except for his lawyer’s error he would not have waived his right to trial and entered a plea.” ¶ 17 (1998), ¶ 44 (2000).

This further inquiry is not only permitted but is desirable because “[a] juror’s preconceived notions or opinions about a case do not necessarily render that juror incompetent to fairly and impartially sit in a case.” ¶ 28 (2000).

In doing so, the court may “rehabilitate a challenged juror through follow-up questions to assure the court that [s]he can sit as a fair and impartial juror.” ¶ 28 (2000).

But in a similar case, the Arizona Supreme Court concluded that a prosecutor’s exercise of a peremptory strike to remove a pastor based on a concern that “pastors are forgiving” was a neutral reason that, coupled with other bases for removal, “more than satisfie[d] Batson.” ¶¶ 15–17 (2000) (analogizing pastors to social workers and concluding “there would [be] no question about the validity of [a] strike” to exclude a social worker as too “forgiving”).

“If a juror is willing to put aside his opinions and base his decision solely upon the evidence, he may serve.” ¶ 28 (2000) (citation omitted).

¶ 28 (2000) ( aff’d on other grounds sub nom.

State v. Velazquez , , 307 ¶ 19, , 98 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Martinez , , 459 ¶ 28, , 803 (2000) ).

The current version of the (F)(2) aggravating circumstance, however, removed ambiguities created by “the prior version’s more vague reference to crimes involving ‘violence.’” ¶ 41

§ 13-703(F)(2) (2001), ¶ 44 , , 302 n. 1, , 864 n. 1 (1982) (quoting Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott, Jr., Handbook on Criminal Law, at 420 (1972)).

“[A] party is not entitled to an instruction when it is adequately covered by other instructions.” ¶ 36

¶19 Simply because a juror favors the death penalty does not, however, necessarily preclude the juror from serving on a jury; if the juror is “willing to put aside his opinions and base his decisions solely upon the evidence, he may serve.” ¶ 28, (citation omitted).

464 ¶ 57, , 808 ¶ 57 (2000).

-59, ¶¶ 26-28 , -03 , cert.

Character or personality disorders usually are not sufficient to find that a defendant was “significantly impaired.”