Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite State v. Prion, 52 P.3d 189.

83 citing documents.

  • State v. Washington Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
  • State v. Washington Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
  • State v. Buruato Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
  • State v. Buruato Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
  • State v. Salamanca 311 P.3d 1105 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2013
  • State v. Salamanca 311 P.3d 1105 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2013
    3 ¶ 14 Although Rule 404(b) requires the court to find by clear and convincing evidence that the other act “was committed and that the defendant committed it,” ¶ 37 , Salamanca never disputed having sent the text messages.
  • State of Arizona v. Steven John Parker 296 P.3d 54 Ariz. 2013
  • State of Arizona v. Steven John Parker 296 P.3d 54 Ariz. 2013
    ¶55 In arguing that a third-party culpability instruction was required, P.3d 1001 (2002), P.3d 189 (2002).
  • State of Arizona v. Jose Raymond Alvarez 269 P.3d 1203 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2012
  • State v. Vega 262 P.3d 628 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2011
  • State v. Vega 262 P.3d 628 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2011
    ¶ 43 , (“sexual propensity evidence under Evidence Rule 404(e) ...
  • State v. Bigger 254 P.3d 1142 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2011
  • State v. Bigger 254 P.3d 1142 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2011
    The court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the evidence because the timing of the “knife incident” could not be connected sufficiently to the time of the murder and thus “it offer[ed] only a possible ground of suspicion against another.”
  • State v. MacHado 246 P.3d 632 Ariz. 2011
  • State v. MacHado 246 P.3d 632 Ariz. 2011
    Shortly thereafter, citing Gibson and again not mentioning Rule 404(b), we stated that third-party culpability evidence “must simply be relevant and then subjected to the normal [Rule] 403 weighing analysis between relevance, on the one hand, and prejudice or confusion on the other.” ¶ 22
  • State of Arizona v. Louie Thomas MacHado Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2010
  • State of Arizona v. Louie Thomas MacHado Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2010
  • State v. Garcia 226 P.3d 370 Ariz. 2010
  • State v. Garcia 226 P.3d 370 Ariz. 2010
  • State of Arizona v. Nathan Andres Leyvas Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2009
  • State of Arizona v. Nathan Andres Leyvas Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2009
  • State v. Cruz 181 P.3d 196 Ariz. 2008
  • State v. Cruz 181 P.3d 196 Ariz. 2008
  • State v. Johnson 133 P.3d 735 Ariz. 2006
  • State v. Johnson 133 P.3d 735 Ariz. 2006
    P. 13.3.a(2); ¶ 32, (defining “otherwise connected together in their commission” as situation in which “evidence of the two crimes [i]s so intertwined and related that much the same evidence [i]s relevant to and would prove both, and the crimes themselves arose out of a series of connected acts”).
  • State v. Moody 94 P.3d 1119 Ariz. 2004
  • State v. Moody 94 P.3d 1119 Ariz. 2004
    We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence for an abuse of discretion if it involves a discretionary issue, ¶ 14 , but review constitutional issues and purely legal issues de novo, ¶ 21 , (analyzing Fourth and Fifth Amendment issues).
  • State v. Dann 74 P.3d 231 Ariz. 2003
  • State v. Dann 74 P.3d 231 Ariz. 2003
    While a defendant may attempt to show that a third party committed the crime with which the defendant is charged, the trial court retains discretion to exclude the evidence if it raises “only a possible ground of suspicion against another.” ¶ 21
  • State v. Smyers 73 P.3d 610 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2003
  • State v. Smyers 73 P.3d 610 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2003
    163 ¶ 37, -84 , -98 (1997); , 274-75 ¶ 24, -11 (App.1999).
  • State v. Tucker 68 P.3d 110 Ariz. 2003
  • State v. Tucker 68 P.3d 110 Ariz. 2003
    ¶ 30 , as supporting the proposition that “evidence [that] consisted of the defendant and another person being acquainted” was sufficiently relevant to meet the Gibson standard.